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"It is unconscionable that the United States should accede to
the Protocol and later claim that it is not bound by it. This court
is astonished that the United States would return Haitian refu-
gees to the jaws of political persecution, terror, death and uncer-
tainty when it has contracted not to do so. The Government's
conduct is particularly hypocritical given its condemnation of
other countries who have refused to abide by the principle of
non-refoulement. As it stands now, Article 33 is a cruel hoax
and not worth the paper it is printed on . . ."
On December 16, 1990, Jean-Bertrand Aristide, a Roman
Catholic priest and populist politician, was elected president of the
Haitian republic. Aristide was the first democratically elected presi-
dent in Haiti's politically turbulent history.2 Subsequently, on Sep-
tember 29, 1991, less than a year later, a military junta composed of
Brigadier General Raoul Cedras, Colonel Aliz Silva, and Colonel
Henri Marc Charles seized political power by coup d'etat.3 The
overthrow of the Aristide regime precipitated an internal armed con-
flict that culminated in the weakening of the rule of law and the
suppression of fundamental human rights."
* Visiting Professor of Law, University of Lagos, Lagos Nigeria; Associate Professor of
Law, Southern University Law Center; B.A., Case Western Reserve University (1975); J.D.,
Howard University School of Law (1978); LL.M., Harvard Law School (1979).
I would like to express my sincere appreciation to my able research assistant, Katherine
Tonnas, and to Yvonne L. Day, proofreader, for their valuable assistance in the preparation of
this article.
1. Haitian Centers Council v. McNary, No. 92 Civ. 1258 U.S. Dist. Lexis 8452, at *4
(E.D.N.Y. June 5, 1992).
2. See Thomas D. Jones, Organization of American States and United Nations' Resolu-
tions in Support of the Democratic Government of Haiti, 7 INT'L ENFORCEMENT L. REP. 436,
437 (Nov. 1991); see also Lee Hockstader, Army Tries Usual Ways Against Unusual Leader,
WASH. POST, Oct. 2, 1991, at A28; John M. Goshko, OAS Names Delegation to Press Haiti,
WASH. POST, Oct. 4, 1991, at A19, A22.
3. Id.
4. See generally UNITED NATIONS PRESS RELEASE, Department of Public Information,
GA/8233 (Oct. 11, 1991); COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES FOR 1991,
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Both the United Nations (hereinafter "UN") and the Organiza-
tion of American States (hereinafter "OAS") responded to the vio-
lent political upheaval by passing resolutions in support of the resto-
ration of democracy and condemning the coup d'etat.5 The UN and
OAS demanded the return of Aristide to power and declared the
Cedras regime illegal under international law. 6 Many of the member
states of these international organizations applied economic sanc-
tions against the Haitian military junta in an effort to force the res-
toration of democracy under Aristide's leadership.' An embargo was
instituted by the OAS and the United States against the Cedras re-
gime. Recently, officials of the United States captured the oil tanker,
Fayou K, which allegedly delivered 250,000 gallons of diesel fuel to
Haiti in defiance of OAS and United States economic embargoes.8
In May 1992, OAS foreign ministers agreed that it had become nec-
essary to strictly impose sanctions against the military regime in Ha-
iti. To date, the junta has refused to reinstate President Aristide.
The foreign ministers now hope that intensification of sanctions will
force the military-backed leadership to restore Aristide to power.9
There was almost unanimous support of a proposal by OAS Secre-
tary-General Joao Baena Soares to "ban ships that do business with
Haiti from OAS members' ports, restrict air traffic to Haiti and
deny travel visas to Haitians who support the [present] govern-
ment."1 The foreign ministers acknowledged that such action might
aggravate the already serious refugee problem."
As a by-product of the political conflict in Haiti, thousands of
Haitians have fled and continue to flee the country in search of ref-
uge in the United States. Approximately 30,000 Haitian refugees
have been intercepted by the United States Coast Guard. Since May
15, 1992, the United States Coast Guard has intercepted 2,106 Hai-
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS. SENATE COMMITTEE ON FOR-
EIGN RELATIONS, 102nd Cong. 2d Sess. (February 1992); RETURN TO THE DARKEST DAYS:
HUMAN RIGHTS IN HAITI SINCE THE Coup, AMERICAS WATCH, NATIONAL COALITION FOR
HAITIAN REFUGEES, AND PHYSICIANS FOR HUMAN RIGHTS (1992) [hereinafter RETURN TO
THE DARKEST DAYS].
5. OAS Resolution MRE/RES. 1/91 OEA/SER. F/V.l, Oct. 3, 1991 (Ad Hoc Meet-
ing of Ministers of Foreign Affairs, Washington, D.C.); OAS Resolution MRE/RES. 2/91,
OEA/SER. F/V.1, Oct. 8, 1991 (Ad Hoc Meeting of Ministers of Foreign Affairs, Washing-
ton, D.C.); GA Res. A/46/L.8/Rev.1, The Situation of Democracy and Human Rights in
Haiti, October 11, 1991, GA Plenary Session, 31st Meeting.
6. Id.
7. See UNITED NATIONS PRESS RELEASE, supra note 4, at 5-11; Howard W, French,
U.S. Will Impose a Trade Ban on Haiti, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 30, 1991, at A3; U.S. Puts Em-
bargo on Haiti, ADVOCATE (Baton Rouge, LA), Oct. 30, 1991, at A2.
8. John M. Goshko, U.S. Seizes Tanker as Violator of OAS Embargo Against Haiti,
WASH. POST, Apr. 3, 1992, at A4.
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tians on the high seas. 2 As is demonstrated in this article, the efforts
of these Haitian refugees to gain admission to the United States by
claiming political refugee status have been fraught with difficulty.
The preceding assertion is buttressed by the Eleventh Circuit's deci-
sions in the appeals litigated by the Haitian Refugee Center, Inc.
(hereinafter "HRC") discussed herein.13
A. Background of HRC Litigation
On November 19, 1991, the Haitian Refugee Center, Inc. 14
filed a verified complaint in the United States District Court for the
Southern District of Florida requesting declaratory and injunctive
relief against the United States government and those agencies en-
gaged in the interdiction of vessels carrying Haitian refugees on the
high seas. 5 The plaintiffs averred that Executive Order 12324, In-
terdiction of Illegal Aliens,'6 did not permit the forcible return to
Haiti of refugees aboard these vessels. Further, the plaintiffs alleged
that the Immigration and Naturalization Service (hereinafter
"INS") had promulgated guidelines to ensure the identification and
protection of refugees. 17 However, defendants failed to follow these
12. OAS Ministers Tighten Squeeze on Haiti, supra, note 9; see also Douglas Farah,
Aristide Denounces U.S. Moves on Haiti, WASH. POST, Feb. 13, 1992, at A33 (approximately
12,000 Haitians were intercepted by the U.S. Coast Guard); see U.S. Argues for Continued
Return of Haitians, WASH. POST, Feb. 15, 1992, at A5 (more than 15,000 Haitians fled the
country after the military coup); but see Howard French, Haiti's Plight - Aristide Seeks
More than Moral Support, N.Y. TiMES, Sept. 27, 1992, at 5.
13. Haitian Refugee Center, Inc., et al. v. James Baker, III, et al., 949 F.2d 1109 (11 th
Cir. 1991) [hereinafter HRC 1]; Haitian Refugee Center, Inc., et al. v. James Baker, Il1, et
al., 950 F.2d 685 (1 1th Cir. 1991) [hereinafter HRC II]; Haitian Refugee Center, Inc., et al.
v. James Baker, Ill, et al., 953 F.2d 1498 (1lth Cir. 1992) [hereinafter HRC III].
14. The district court described HRC as follows:
HRC is a nonprofit membership corporation located in Miami, Florida. The
HRC's purpose, as set forth in its Bylaws, is to promote the well-being of Hai-
tian refugees through appropriate programs and activities, including legal repre-
sentation of Haitian refugees. It has brought lawsuits and procedures and [sic]
practices of the Immigration and Naturalization Service (hereinafter "INS") in
processing Haitian refugee applications and has been recognized by the INS as a
source of legal counsel for indigent Haitians. The HRC's membership includes
Haitian refugees seeking political asylum in the United States.
Haitian Refugee Center, Inc., et al. v. James Baker, III et al., No. 91-2635, at 8 n.2 (S.D. Fla.
Dec. 3, 1991) (Order Granting Preliminary Injunctive Relief and Supporting Memorandum
Opinion).
15. Haitian Refugee.Center, Inc. et al. v. James Baker III, et al., No. 91-2635, at I
(S.D. Fla. Nov. 19, 1991) (Verified Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief) [herein-
after Verified Complaint]. The named defendants in the lawsuit were James Baker, III, Secre-
tary of State; Rear Admiral Robert Kramek and Admiral Kime [sic], Commandants of the
United States Coast Guard; Gene McNary, Commissioner, Immigration and Naturalization
Service; the United States Department of Justice; the Immigration and Naturalization Service;
and the United States.
16. Id. at 2; Exec. Order No. 12,324, 46 Fed. Reg. 48,109 (1981), reprinted in 8 U.S.C.
§ 1182 (1982).
17. Supra note 15, at 2. The guidelines entitled INS Role in and Guidelines for In-
terdiction (Revised: September 24, 1982) provide, inter alia:
The following directives are to be followed by INS employees assigned to Coast
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guidelines designed to protect the rights of potential political asylum
Guard vessels interdicting vessels at sea pursuant to Presidential Proclamation
Number 4865, dated September 29, 1981, and Executive Order Number 12324,
dated September 29, 1981.
General:
-Due to the sensitive nature of this assignment, all INS employees will be under
the direct supervision of INS Central Office Headquarters, Associate Commis-
sioner, Examinations.
-The only function INS officers are responsible for is to ensure that the United
States is in compliance with its obligations regarding actions toward refugees,
including the necessity of being keenly attuned during any interdiction program
to any evidence which may reflect an individual's well-founded fear of persecu-
tion by his or her country of origin for reasons of race, religion, nationality,
membership within a particular social group or political opinion.
-The duties of INS employees assigned to United States Coast Guard vessels will
be limited to matters related to the interview of persons on board with respect to
documentation relating to entry into the United States and possible evidence of
refugee status.
-Except for independent determinations with respect to documentation relating
to entry into the United States and possible claims to refugee status, INS of-
ficers will be subject to maritime directives and rules made by the Commanding
Officer of the United States Coast Guard vessel.
BOARDING OF VESSELS:
All decisions relating to which vessels will be interdicted and in what manner
vessels will be boarded will be made at the discretion of the Commanding Officer
of the United States Coast Guard vessel.
-INS officers and interpreters will be members of each boarding party. INS em-
ployees will not be armed.
-All initial announcements to the master, crew and passengers of a boarded ves-
sel as to the purpose of boarding, separation of crew and passengers, and general
procedures (including advice that the boarded vessel may be returned to Haiti)
will be made by the United States Coast Guard personnel at the time the vessel
is first boarded.
AUTHORITY.-
I.Presidential Proclamation Number 4865 dated September 29, 1991 (High
Seas Interdiction of Illegal Aliens).
2.Executive Order Number 12324 dated September 29, 1981 (Interdiction of
Illegal Aliens).
3.Associate Attorney General's directive to the Acting Commissioner of INS,
dated October 2, 1981.
4.Article 33, United Nations Convention and Protocol Relating to the Status of
Refugees.
INS OFFICER RESPONSIBILITIES:
A.To the extent that it is, within the opinion of the Commanding Officer of the
United States Coast Guard vessel, safe and practicable, each person aboard an
interdicted vessel shall be spoken to by an INS officer, through an interpreter. A





4.Home Town (obtain sufficient information to enable a later location of
the individual to check on possible persecution);
5.AIl Documents or Evidence Presented;
6.Why did you leave Haiti;
7.Why do you wish to go to the United States;
8.1s there any reason why you cannot return to Haiti?
B.A copy of the log prepared by the INS officers shall be provided to the Com-
manding Officer of the Coast Guard vessel.
C.INS officers shall be constantly watchful for any indication (including bare
claims) that a person or persons on board the interdicted vessel may qualify as
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applicants.18 Moreover, HRC charged that defendants were in viola-
tion of the rules of international law against refoulement as memori-
alized in the United Nations Protocol Relating to the Status of Ref-
ugees (hereinafter "1967 Protocol").19 Also, the plaintiffs asserted
that the conduct of the defendants deprived the interdicted Haitians
of the protections set forth in the Refugee Act of 1980, the Immigra-
tion and Nationality Act (hereinafter "INA"), the regulations
promulgated pursuant to these Acts, and the Fifth Amendment to
the United States Constitution.20
HRC claimed that Haitians fleeing persecution from the Cedras
junta would suffer irreparable harm because their forcible return to
Haiti would jeopardize both their liberty and lives. 1 In addition,
HRC alleged the threat of irreparable harm and direct injury by the
defendants because the actions of the government thwarted its orga-
nizational purpose. Because of the defendants' recalcitrance in deny-
ing HRC access to the interdictees, HRC averred that it was unable
to effectively provide assistance of counsel to those refugees who
refugees under the United Nations Convention and Protocol.
D.If there is any indication of possible qualification for refugee status by a per-
son or persons on board an interdicted vessel, INS officers shall conduct individ-
ual interviews regarding such possible qualification.
E.lterviews regarding possible refugee status shall be conducted out of the
hearing of other persons.
F.If necessary, INS officers will consult with Department of State officials, ei-
ther on board, or via radio communications.
G.lndividual records shall be made of all interviews regarding possible qualifica-
tion for refugee status.
H.If the interview suggests that a bona fide claim to refugee status may exist,
the person involved shall be removed from the interdicted vessel, and his or her
passage to the United States shall be arranged.
l.Individual record folders shall be prepared and maintained by INS officers in
every case where a person is being sent on to the United States, and such record
folder may be used to support such person's claim in the United States. (The
individual folder shall contain a sworn statement by the applicant concerning the
claim.)"
See INS ROLE IN AND GUIDELINES FOR INTERDICTION AT SEA, Oct. 6, 1981, Revised: Sept.
24, 1982 [hereinafter INS GUIDELINES]; see also Proclamation No. 4865, 46 Fed. Reg. 48,107
(1981), reprinted in 8 U.S.C § 1182 (1982) (President Ronald Reagan declared the migration
of aliens without visas to U.S. "a serious national problem detrimental to the interest of the
United States. A particularly difficult aspect of the problem is the continuing illegal migration
by sea of large numbers of undocumented aliens into the southeastern United States ....
[Ilnternational cooperation to intercept vessels trafficking in illegal migrants is a necessary and
proper means of insuring the effective enforcement of our laws."); see generally Interdiction
Agreement, Sept 23, 1981, U.S.-Haiti, 19 U.S.T. 3559.
18. Verified Complaint, supra note 15, at 2.
19. Id. at 2-3;'see Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, opened for signature,
Jan. 31, 1967, 19 U.S.T. 6223, 6225, 606 U.N.T.S. 268 (United States acceded to 1967 Proto-
col on November 1, 1968); see also Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, opened for
signature, July 28, 1951, 189 U.N.T.S. 150.
20. Verified Complaint, supra note 15, at 3; see Immigration and Nationality Act [here-
inafter INA], as amended by the Refugee Act of 1980, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101 (1980); see primar-
ily 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h) (1990) of the INA, as amended by Refugee Act of 1980 and 8 U.S.C.
§ 1158(a) (1990) as added to the INA by Refugee Act of 1980.
21. Verified Complaint, supra note 15, at 14.
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claimed political refugee status.12 Lastly, HRC alleged that the "de-
fendants' failure to comply with INS guidelines . . . threatens to
deprive the HRC of the benefits that would inure to it from the pres-
ence of these Haitians, who are members of HRC, in the United
States."23
In its amended and second amended complaints, HRC con-
tended that the First and Fifth Amendments were violated, due to
the government's refusal to allow HRC access to refugees at Guan-
tanamo Bay and on Coast Guard cutters.2 Consequently, the refu-
gees were denied the effective assistance of legal counsel and HRC
was denied its right to association. Finally, the plaintiffs claimed that
the federal Administrative Procedure Act (hereinafter "APA") pro-
vided an enforceable legal remedy that allowed the court to review
the defendants' conduct pursuant to the law of the 1967 Protocol,
Executive Order 12324, the INA, the Refugee Act of 1980, the INS
Guidelines, and the First and Fifth Amendments.
25
1. HRC .- On December 3, 1991, the district court granted
preliminary injunctive relief to the plaintiffs, prohibiting the defend-
ants from repatriating Haitians in their custody. These Haitian refu-
gees were aboard Coast Guard vessels and detained at Guantanamo
Bay, Cuba.26 In HRC I, the defendants sought expedited review in
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit.27 On December
17, 1991, in a brief one and one-half page opinion, the court of ap-
peals reversed the district court's order granting injunctive relief.
The district court, applying the standard for granting preliminary
injunctions,28 found that there was a substantial likelihood that the
plaintiffs would prevail on two of their legal claims. Clyde Atkins,
district court judge, ruled that there was a substantial likelihood that
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Haitian Refugee Center Inc., et al. v. James Baker I1l, et al., No. 91-2653, at 1-3
(S.D. Fla. Nov. 21, 1991) (Amendment as of Right to Plaintiffs' Verified Complaint) [herein-
after Amendment as of Right]; Haitian Refugee Center Inc., et al. v. James Baker 111, et al.,
No. 91-2653, at 26 (1991) (Second Amended Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief
Class Action) [hereinafter Second Amended Complaint.
25. Seconded Amended Complaint, supra note 24, at 3, 25, 29, 30-31, 32-33 (1991).
26. HRC I, 949 F.2d 1109, 1110 (11th Cir. 1991).
27. Id. at 1109, 1110.
28. The legal standard which must be met for a movant to prevail on a preliminary
injunction is as follows:
(l)a substantial likelihood of success on the merits;
(2)a substantial threat of suffering irreparable harm or injury;
(3)balancing the equities, the threatened injury to the moving party must out-
weigh the potential harm an injunction would cause to the nonmoving party; and
(4)consideration of the impact the injunction would have on the public interest.
Tally-Ho, Inc. v. Coast Community College Dist., 889 F.2d 1018, 1022 (1lth Cir. 1989);
Haitian Refugee Center, Inc. v. Nelson, 872 F.2d 1555, 1561-62 (11 th Cir. 1989), aft'd, 111
S.Ct. 888 (1991); United States v. Lambert, 695 F.2d 536, 539 (1Ith Cir. 1983).
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HRC would prevail on its allegation that its First Amendment rights
to association and counsel were violated because of the government's
refusal to allow HRC access to the detained Haitians. Also, Judge
Atkins held that the plaintiffs would probably prevail on their claim
of a right to nonrefoulement under Article 33 of the 1967 Protocol.2"
The court of appeals rejected both of the preceding legal rulings of
the district court.
Accepting the government's argument, the court of appeals held
that Article 33 of the '1967 Protocol was not self-executing. No im-
plementing legislation had been passed by Congress to give domestic
legal force to the 1967 Protocol. 0 If the 1967 Protocol were self-
executing, no congressional legislative action would be necessary.
The 1967 Protocol would directly afford rights to persons seeking
refugee status in the United States. Individuals such as the Haitian
interdictees would possess the right to redress their grievances in a
domestic court of law.31 The court of appeals suggested that Article
33 of the 1967 Protocol did not have extraterritorial effect, so the
Haitians would be without a legal remedy because they had never
reached the territory of the United States. 2
The court of appeals further decided that the First Amendment
claim of HRC, asserting a right of access to the Haitian interdictees,
could not serve as a proper legal basis for sustaining the injunction.
The relief granted by the district court's injunctive order was not
related to the First Amendment allegation.3 3 The district court's or-
der did not require the defendants to permit HRC access to the Hai-
tians. The order simply enjoined the government from repatriating
them.34 Thus, the district court's order failed to address the plain-
tiffs' First Amendment claim and the claim could not support the
preliminary injunctive relief granted HRC. 35 The court of appeals
opined that the district court's refusal to grant injunctive relief based
29. HRC 1, 949 F.2d 1109, 1110 (1 1th Cir. 1991) (citing Protocol Relating to the Sta-
tus of Refugees, open for signature, Jan. 31, 1967, art. 33, 19 U.S.T. 6223, 606 U.N.T.S.
268):
I.No contracting state shall expel or return ("refouler") a refugee in any man-
ner whatsoever to the frontiers of territories where his life or freedom would be
threatened on account of his race, religion, nationality, membership in a particu-
lar social group, or political opinion.
2.The benefit of the present provision may not, however, be claimed by a refugee
whom there are reasonable grounds for regarding as a danger to the security of
the country in which he is, or who, having been convicted by a final judgment of
a particularly serious crime, constitutes a danger to the community of that
country.
30. HRC 1, 949 F.2d 1109, 1110, (1lth Cir. 1991).
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 1110-11.
34. id. at 1111.
35. HRC 1, 949 F.2d 1109, 1111 (11th Cir. 1991).
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on the federal APA was not before the court because the plaintiffs
did not cross-appeal. s6 The court of appeals held that a ruling on the
APA claim "would constitute a holding by this court, on appeal, that
the plaintiffs are entitled to injunctive relief on the APA claim as a
matter of law." ' Accordingly, the court of appeals dissolved the pre-
liminary injunction and remanded the case, instructing the district
court to dismiss the Article 33 claim on the merits.3 8
In a strong dissenting opinion, Judge Hatchett categorically re-
jected the summary analysis of the majority. He asserted that only
Haitian refugees are intercepted on the high seas and repatriated to
their country of origin.39 The district court's order did not bar the
return of refugees to Haiti. It delayed their return until the asylum
claims of the refugees could be properly determined by the defend-
ants.40 Judge Hatchett noted that the balance of the equities was in
favor of the Haitians who might suffer persecution or death if re-
turned to the Cedras regime.41 Judge Hatchett accused the defend-
ants of operating an interdiction program for the sole purpose of
keeping Haitians out of the United States."' By intercepting Hai-
tians on the high seas, in international waters, the United States cir-
cumvented its international obligations under the 1967 Protocol and
domestic law.4 3
Judge Hatchett further ruled that the APA claim alleged by
36. Id. The nature of the Administrative Procedure Act [hereinafter APA] claim is not
discussed in detail by the majority. However, the district court in rejecting the APA claim
held:
Fourth and finally, plaintiffs contend that the Administrative Procedures Act
(APA), 5 U.S.C. §§ 551 et seq., provides a source of judicially enforceable
rights. Based upon our review of the law, however, we find that HRC has failed
to show a substantial likelihood that the APA would provide the relief sought,
primarily because it appears that the actions in question are committed to
agency discretion by law, 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(2). The statutory provisions under
which the interdiction program is principally carried out provides the following:
Wherever the President finds that the entry of any aliens or of any class
of aliens into the United States would be detrimental to the interests of
the United States, he may by proclamation, and for such period as he
shall deem necessary, suspend the entry of all aliens or any class of aliens
as immigrants or nonimmigrant, or impose upon the entry of aliens any
restrictions he may deem to be appropriate.
8 U.S.C. § 1182(f). By this provision, Congress has delegated to the President
extremely broad discretion to act. Moreover, exercise of this discretion is hot
limited to circumstances defined in the statute, but rather is geared to Executive
'find[ings]' and what is 'deem[ed]' necessary or appropriate, the statute provides
no discernable standards by which this court can review the challenged actions
under the APA.
Order Granting Preliminary Injunctive Relief, supra, note 14, at 54-55.





42. HRC 1, 949 F.2d 1109, 1112 (11th Cir. 1991).
43. Id.
IMMIGRATION LAW
HRC was valid and should have been reviewed by the court of ap-
peals. HRC argued that the APA created an enforceable right which
allowed HRC to challenge the conduct or actions of lower executive
branch officials in their administration of the interdiction program
pursuant to Executive Order 12324, the Refugee Act of 1980, and
the INA." Judge Hatchett contended that there was no jurisdic-
tional impediment forbidding consideration of the APA claim, even
though the plaintiffs did not cross-appeal. The denial or grant of a
preliminary injunction gives the court jurisdiction on all issues ruled
upon by the district court.4
In addition, Judge Hatchett concluded that Article 33 of the
1967 Protocol was self-executing and applied extraterritorially. 6
Quoting from United States v. Postal,4" 7 the Judge stated that
"whether a treaty is self-executing is a matter of interpretation by
the courts." 8 He stated that a court must consider the parties' in-
tent, the legislative history, and the subject matter of the treaty. It is
difficult to determine the common intent of parties to a multilateral
treaty by a textual analysis of its language. Therefore, the exercise
of attempting to ascertain the common intent of the parties as re-
flected in the treaty's language is the least helpful process. 9 Judge
Hatchett suggested that the majority should have considered only
the subject matter, legislative history, and subsequent treaty con-
struction.50 He then stated that the 1967 Protocol's subject matter
revealed its self-executing nature because the treaty does not ex-
pressly call for positive legislation.51 The legislative history surround-
ing the 1967 Protocol militates in favor of self-execution. The Senate
committee report recommending accession indicated that the United
States was automatically bound by Articles 2 through 34 of the 1967
Protocol. 2 Subsequent judicial construction of the 1967 Protocol
supports the self-executing nature of the treaty. Several domestic ju-
dicial decisions have characterized the 1967 Protocol as self-execut-
ing, including a decision by the Board of Immigration Appeals.5
As to the extraterritorial effect of the 1967 Protocol, Judge
Hatchett relied on the plain meaning of the language of the treaty,
44. Id. at 1112-13.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 1113.
47. HRC 1, 949 F.2d 1109, 1114 (11th Cir. 1991); United States v. Postal, 589 F.2d
862 (5th Cir. 1979).
48. HRC I, 949 F.2d 1109, 1114 (11th Cir. 1991); United States v. Postal, 589 F.2d
862, 876 (5th Cir. 1979).
49. HRC 1, 949 F.2d 1109, 1114 (11th Cir. 1991).
50. Id. at 1114-15.
51. Id. at 1114.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 1114-15; see Matter of Dunbar, No. 2192, slip op. at 313 (Interim Decision of
Board of Immigration Appeals, Apr. 17, 1973).
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which states, inter alia: "No contracting state shall expel or return a
refugee fleeing bona fide persecution, in any manner whatsoever, to
the frontiers of territories where his life or freedom would be
threatened." '54 Judge Hatchett pointed to the fact that the United
Nations High Commissioner for Refugees adheres to the legal inter-
pretation that the nonrefoulement principle applies extraterritorially
on the high seas.55
Finally, Judge Hatchett decided that HRC had a substantial
likelihood of success on its First Amendment right of access claim.
Relying on Jean v. Nelson, 5 he argued that HRC, as counsel, had a
right to advise the Haitians of their rights. HRC would act without
remuneration and as an exercise of its First Amendment right to
engage in political speech.57 The fact that the Haitians were not
within the United States should not have diminished HRC's right of
access. HRC may invoke its constitutional rights which were in-
fringed by the government outside the United States.58 The lone dis-
senter observed that Guantanamo Bay is under the control and com-
plete jurisdiction of the United States. Judge Hatchett agreed with
the majority that Guantanamo Bay was a nonpublic forum. Never-
theless, the government acted unreasonably in denying HRC access
to those Haitians who needed counseling. The government might
have restricted HRC's access by application of "reasonable, content-
neutral, time, place and manner restrictions. ' 59 Hence, Judge
Hatchett was.of the opinion that the preliminary injunction should
not have been dismissed until the legal issues in the case had been
resolved on the merits.60
2. HRC H.-After the court of appeals rendered its decision
on December 17, 1991, the district court issued a temporary re-
straining order to allow reconsideration of the plaintiffs' APA
claim.6" The defendants requested a stay of the order pending ap-
peal, but the motion for stay was denied." The temporary re-
straining order, which prevented the repatriation of Haitian in-
terdictees, spawned yet another appeal. 63 In HRC II, the court of
appeals, in accepting jurisdiction to consider the validity of the tem-
porary restraining order, stated that temporary restraining orders
54. HRC 1, 949 F.2d 1109, 1115 (1lth Cir. 1991).
55. Id.
56. Id. at 1116; Jean v. Nelson, 727 F.2d 957, 983 (11th Cir. 1984).
57. HRC I, 949 F.2d 1109, 1116 (1lth Cir. 1991).
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 1116-17.
61. HRC 11, 950 F.2d 685 (11th Cir. 1991).




were not ordinarily appealable.6" However, the majority of the court
ruled that the district court's order had the effect of a preliminary
injunction. Therefore, the court of appeals held that its exercise of
jurisdiction was not controlled by the district court's erroneous desig-
nation.65 Although characterized as a temporary restraining order,
the district court issued the order after briefing and a full hearing on
the merits. 6 The court of appeals emphasized the fact that the APA
claim had been rejected by the district court in its December 3, 1991
decision. 7 The district court had held that there was no substantial
likelihood of success by plaintiffs on the APA claim, at trial.6 8 The
court of appeals then concluded:
. . . [T]here is a strong likelihood that the defendants [empha-
sis added] will prevail on [the APA] claim for the reasons stated
by the district court in its original Order Granting Preliminary
Injunctive Relief dated December 3, 1991. We conclude that the
appellants' motion seeking a stay of that order pending appeal is
due to be granted.69
Consequently, the court of appeals stayed and suspended the district
court's temporary restraining order pending appeal.
70
As in HRC I, Judge Hatchett dissented. He asserted that on
December 17, 1991, the majority of the court dissolved the Decem-
ber 3, 1991 preliminary injunction. At that time, the court of ap-
peals stated that it could not reach the APA issue because plaintiffs
had not cross-appealed. 71 The majority opinion of December 17,
1991 suggested that the APA claim needed development in the dis-
trict court. 72 Thus, the district court properly concluded the APA
claim was ripe for reconsideration. 3 Judge Hatchett complained that
the majority inappropriately reviewed the APA claim and errone-
ously held that the district court considered the claim in its Decem-
ber 3, 1991 ruling.74 In fact, the district court had considered a dif-
ferent APA claim from the one decided on December 3, 1991.
Specifically, he wrote:
The district court makes clear that its previous ruling on the
APA claim, which this court earlier refused to review, was based
64. Id. Again, the court of appeals opinion is approximately one page.
65. Id.
66. HRC II, 950 F.2d 685-686 (11th Cir. 1991).
67. Id.; see district court's reasons for denying APA claim, supra note 36.
68. HRC II, 950 F.2d 685, 686 (11th Cir. 1991).




73. HRC II, 950 F.2d 685, 687 (11th Cir. 1991).
74. Id.
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upon the discretion which Congress had delegated to the Presi-
dent; whereas, the district court is now considering the APA
claim based on 'subordinates discretion or lack thereof in fol-
lowing program procedures and guidelines.' In 91-6060, this
court refused to reach the APA claim under any theory; now,
through some procedure here before unknown to the law, the
majority is able not only to reach the APA claim, but to decide
that the claim is without merit even though no hearing has been
held and the district court has made no factual findings or legal
conclusions ....
Judge Hatchett stated that the denial of the motion for stay pending
appeal was appropriate and the appeal should have been dismissed
because temporary restraining orders are not appealable under the
law of the circuit.76
3. HRC III.-The final appeal in the HRC trilogy was re-
solved by the court of appeals on February 4, 1992. In HRC III, the
court of appeals completed its disposition of the case on the merits
by ordering the district court to dismiss the action for failure to state
a claim upon which relief could be granted. 7 Subsequent to its De-
cember 19, 1991 order staying the district court's temporary re-
straining order of December 17, 1991, the district court granted
"limited preliminary injunctive relief" on December 20, 1991.78 This
injunctive relief was predicated upon HRC's claim that it possessed
a First Amendment right of access to the interdicted Haitians for
the purpose of counseling them."9 The district court ordered the gov-
ernment to grant HRC meaningful access to the Haitians limited by
reasonable, content-neutral, time, place and manner restrictions."
The district court denied relief to the plaintiffs based on alleged
rights enforceable under Executive Order 12324, the INA, and the
Refugee Act of 1980.81 On December 23, 1991, the district court
granted further preliminary injunctive relief based on plaintiffs'
APA claim of judicial review. Again, the district court ordered the
defendants to refrain from repatriating Haitians pending resolution
75. Id. at 687-88.
76. Id. at 688.
77. HRC III, 953 F.2d 1498, 1515 (1lth Cir. 1992).
78. Id. at 1504; see Haitian Refugee Center Inc., et al. v. James Baker III, et al., No.
91-2635 (S.D. Fla. Dec. 20, 1991) (Order Granting Limited Preliminary Injunctive Relief)
[hereinafter Order Granting Limited Injunctive Relief].
79. HRC 11I, 953 F.2d 1498, 1515 (1lth Cir. 1992); see Order Granting Limited In-
junctive Relief, supra note 78, at 8-10 ("HRC lack[s] . . . alternative means of exercising its
first amendment right and . . . HRC's interest would further government's interest in assuring
that no political refugee was wrongfully repatriated.").
80. HRC III, 953 F.2d 1498,1515 (lth Cir. 1992); see Order Granting Limited In-
junctive Relief, supra note 78, at 10.
81. HRC III, 953 F.2d 1498, 1515 (lth Cir. 1992); see Order Granting Limited In-
junctive Relief, supra note 78, at 10.
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of all claims on the merits.82 The defendants appealed from all dis-
trict court rulings granting injunctive relief. The plaintiffs cross-ap-
pealed contesting the district court's denial of relief based on the
Executive Order 12324, the INA and the Refugee Act of 1980.83
The court of appeals concluded that the APA did not authorize
judicial review of the defendants' action pursuant to the law re-
flected in the 1967 Protocol, Executive Order 12324, the INA as
amended by the Refugee Act of 1980, or the INS Guidelines. First,
the majority held that judicial review under the APA was precluded
by 5 U.S.C. § 702 (a)l because the provisions of the INA provided
the exclusive means for judicial review for plaintiffs. 84 The plaintiffs
claimed that 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h) had been violated by the defend-
ants by its return of Haitians who were political refugees to Haiti.
The court of appeals ruled that § 1253(h) was included in Part V of
the INA, which concerns the deportation of aliens, and that the de-
portation provisions of Part V apply only to aliens within the bound-
aries of the United States.85 Furthermore, the majority of the court
held it logically followed that 8 U.S.C. 1252(b) of Part V, which
delineates the process or procedures for determining deportability, is
82. HRC III, 953 F.2d 1498, 1504 (11th Cir. 1992).
83. Id.
84. Id. at 1505-06. Title 5 U.S.C. § 702 (1976) of the APA provides, in relevant part:
"A person suffering legal wrong because of agency action, or adversely affected or aggrieved
by agency action within the meaning of a relevant statute is entitled to judicial review
thereof." However, 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(1) and (2) (1966) create exceptions to the right of
judicial review permitted by § 702. Section 701(a)(1) and (2) (1976) state:
(a)This chapter applies, according to the provisions thereof, except to the extent
that
(l)statutes preclude judicial review; or
(2)agency action is committed to agency discretion by law.
85. HRC III, 953 F.2d 1498, 1506 (1lth Cir. 1992). Title 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h) (1990)
provides, in toto:
(l)The Attorney General shall not deport or return any alien (other than an
alien described in section 1251 (a)(4)(D) of this title) to a country if the Attor-
ney General determines that such alien's life or freedom would be threatened in
such country on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particu-
lar social group, or political opinion.
(2)Paragraph (1) shall not apply to any alien if the Attorney General determines
that'
(A)the alien ordered, incited assisted, or otherwise participated in the
persecution of any person on account of race, religion, nationality, mem-
bership in a particular social group, or political opinion;
(B)the alien, having been convicted by a final judgment of a particularly
serious crime, constitutes a danger to the community of the United
States;
(C)there are serious reasons for considering that the alien has committed
a serious non-political crime outside the United States prior to the arrival
of the alien in the United States; or
(D)there are reasonable grounds for regarding the alien as a danger to
the security of the United States.
For purposes of subparagraph (B) an alien who has been convicted of an aggra-
vated felony shall be considered to have committed a particularly serious crime.
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applicable solely to aliens in the United States. 8 Moreover, the court
explained that 8 U.S.C. § 1105 (a) sets out the exclusive procedure
for judicial review of all final deportation orders issued pursuant to §
1252(b). Section 1105(a) states that such procedures for judicial re-
view apply only to aliens within the United States.
87
The court of appeals ruled that the judicial review procedures
that applied to aliens within the United States could be contrasted
with the requirements of 8 U.S.C. § 1157, which is applicable to
refugees seeking admission to the United States. 8 Section 1157
gives the Attorney General limited discretion to admit refugees.
However, there is no right to judicial review provided for those who
are denied admission. 89 The substantive legal requirements of §
86. HRC III, 953 F.2d 1498, 1506 (11th Cir. 1992). Title 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b) (1954)
provides, inter alia:
A special inquiry officer shall conduct proceedings under this section to deter-
mine the deportability of any alien, and shall administer oaths, present and re-
ceive evidence, interrogate, examine and cross-examine the alien or witnesses,
and, as authorized by the Attorney General, shall make determinations, includ-
ing orders of deportation. Determination of deportability in any case shall be
made only upon a record made in a proceeding before a special inquiry officer, at
which the alien shall have reasonable opportunity to be present, unless by reason
of the alien's mental incompetency it is impracticable for him to be present, in
which case the Attorney General shall prescribe necessary and proper safeguards
for the rights and privileges of such alien. If any alien has been given a reasona-
ble opportunity to be present at a proceeding under this section, and without
reasonable cause fails or refuses to attend or remain in attendance at such pro-
ceeding, the special inquiry officer may proceed to a determination in like man-
ner as if the alien were present. In any case or class of cases in which the Attor-
ney General believes that such procedure would be of aid in making a
determination, he may require specifically or by regulation that an additional
immigration officer shall be assigned to present the evidence on behalf of the
United States and in such case such additional immigration officer shall have
authority to present evidence, and to interrogate, examine and cross-examine the
alien or other witnesses in the proceedings. Nothing in the preceding sentence
shall be construed to diminish the authority conferred upon the special inquiry
officer conducting such proceedings. No special inquiry officer shall conduct a
proceeding in any case under this section in which he shall have participated in
investigative functions or in which he shall have participated (except as provided
in this subsection) in prosecuting functions ....
87. HRC Ii, 953 F.2d 1498, 1506 (11th Cir. 1992). Title 8 U.S.C. § 1105(a) (1981)
provides, inter alia:
The procedure prescribed by, and all provisions of Chapter 158 of title 28 shall
apply to, and shall be the sole and exclusive procedure for, the judicial review of
all final orders of deportation, heretofore or hereafter made against aliens within
the United States pursuant to administrative proceedings under section 1252(b)
of the title or comparable provisions of any prior Act . ...
88. HRC III, 953 F.2d 1498, 1506 (11 th Cir. 1992). Title 8 U.S.C. § 1157(c)(1) (1991)
provides, inter alia:
Subject to the numerical limitations established pursuant to subsections (a) and
(b) of this section, the Attorney General may, in the Attorney General's discre-
tion and pursuant to such regulations as the Attorney General may prescribe,
admit any refugee 'who is not firmly resettled in any foreign country, is deter-
mined to be of special humanitarian concern to the United States, and is admis-
sible except as otherwise provided under paragraph (3) as an immigrant under
this chapter . . ..
89. HRC 111, 953 F.2d 1498, 1506 (11th Cir. 1992).
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1252(b) and the procedures for judicial review in § 1105(a), as com-
pared with the total absence of a right to judicial review under §
1157, reveals the congressional intent to preclude judicial review of
agency decisions denying admission to aliens who are not within the
United States.9" The court of appeals buttressed its textual interpre-
tation of the INA, as amended by the Refugee Act of 1980, by dis-
cussing the decisional law, which it suggested supported both its
statutory construction and the legal proposition that refugees or
aliens who are not within the country or at its borders have no right
to judicial review of administrative decisions excluding them.9
The majority of the court noted that an alternative reason the
plaintiffs had no right to judicial review pursuant to the APA was
because § 701(a)(2) precludes review "where agency action is com-
mitted to agency discretion by law," except where the agency failed
to follow its own binding regulations. 92 This principle is applicable
where a statute granting discretion to the agency is so broad and
expansive that there is "no law for courts to apply when reviewing
the agency action."93 The court held that 8 U.S.C. § 1182(f) granted
the President broad discretion or plenary power to control the en-
trance of aliens into the United States.9 4 The statute allows the Pres-
ident to exclude aliens "as he deems necessary. ' 95 The President
promulgated Executive Order 12324 to implement his authority
under § 1182(f).96 HRC readily admitted that Executive Order
12324 of the President was nonreviewable; but it contended that the
President's subordinates failed to comply with the guidelines issued
to enforce the executive order. Consequently, the subordinates' ac-
tions are subject to judicial review. 97 The court of appeals decided
that the "logical extension of this argument would make all of the
President's discretionary decisions subject to review, except in mat-
ters he could personally execute without the assistance of subordi-
nates. ' 98 The majority of the court concluded that neither § 1182 (f)
nor 1253(h), nor any other act of Congress provided any guidelines
regarding the procedure to be used in making decisions concerning
the repatriation of aliens who have not reached the shores of the
United States.9 9 It would be inappropriate for the court to exercise
90. Id.
91. Id. at 1506-07.
92. Id. at 1507.
93. Id. (citing Citizens to Preserve Overton Park Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1971)).




98. Id. at n. 5.
99. HRC 1II, 953 F.2d 1498, 1508 (11th Cir. 1992).
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judicial review over the operation of the executive branch. 100 The
majority of the court held that Executive Order 12324 did not iden-
tify specific facts to be considered when determining refugee status.
Nor did Executive Order 12324 suggest how competing interests are
to be balanced by INS officials. 10 1 The determination of refugee sta-
tus was left to the INS officials. Official discretion was unconstrained
by binding agency regulations.0 2 Consequently, Executive Order
12324 did not provide meaningful standards for ascertaining the
scope of agency discretion.'
Similarly, the court of appeals ruled that the INS Guidelines
provided no constraint or limitation on INS official discretion to ex-
clude aliens or determine refugee status.104 The INS Guidelines con-
tained no meaningful standards for judicial review of agency action
where discretion has been exercised to exclude an alien who is
outside the boundaries of the United States.10 5 The majority reiter-
ated its conclusion that the INA is inapplicable to aliens who have
not reached the United States and provided no standards for review
of INS official discretion in this particular case. Also, the court of
appeals held that Article 33 of the 1967 Protocol failed to provide
standards against which to judge the defendants' procedures.106
Thus, there were no binding agency regulations limiting the agency's
discretion. The agency did not breach any such regulations. The
agency's action was committed to the agency's discretion under
701(a)(2) and unreviewable pursuant to the APA.10 7 The majority
supported its position by noting that the Supplemental Appropriation
Act of 1951 contained a rider providing that expulsion and exclusion
proceedings involving aliens are not governed by sections 5, 7, and 8
of the APA. 08
Next, the court of appeals ruled that the plaintiffs had no inde-
pendently enforceable claims under the INA, as amended by the
Refugee Act of 1980, Executive Order 12324, the INS Guidelines,
or customary international law. The court of appeals held that
INA's asylum provision at 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a), which was added by
the Refugee Act of 1980, by it terms, limits the application of the
provision to "an alien physically present in the United States or at a
land border or port of entry."109 The plain and clear meaning of the








108. Id. at 1509.
109. HRC 111, 953 F.2d 1498, 1510 (11th Cir. 1992).
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unambiguous language of § 1158(a) indicates that those outside the
country on the high seas are not protected by the statute.1 ' Addi-
tionally, HRC claimed that the amendment of 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h)
supported its view that the INA applied to refugees outside the
United States. The Refugee Act of 1980 amended the provision to
provide that the Attorney General shall not "deport or return" any
alien to any country where he or she might be persecuted."' The
words "or return" were added to the statute and the language
"within the United States" was deleted.
The HRC argued that the changes were evidence of congres-
sional intent to broaden the scope of the statute, so as to protect
those beyond the borders of the United States." 2 The majority re-
jected the argument by restating its earlier conclusion that §
1253(h) is in Part V of INA. The deportation provisions of Part V
apply to aliens in the United States. 1 3 Further, the language of §
1253(h) was changed to conform with Article 33 of the 1967
Protocol.
114
The court of appeals rejected the plaintiffs' argument that Exec-
utive Order 12324 gave rise to a private cause of action. The Execu-
tive Order's purpose was to establish a process for interdicting Hai-
tians in international waters. Executive Order 12324 established the
interdiction enforcement process on the high seas. The procedure
contemplated by the order was an expeditious screening of in-
terdictees with the goal of determining whether any interdictees
aboard vessels had legitimate political refugee claims." 5 Since this
process was to occur on the high seas, the appellate court asserted
that it could not have been the intent of the President to allow these
aliens access to United States judicial system.'1 No private civil ac-
tion in the district court was intended.
117
The court of appeals decided that the INS Guidelines created
no enforceable substantive rights for the Haitians.118 The majority of
the court characterized these guidelines as similar to internal operat-
ing instructions. The INS Guidelines are not regulations. They are
110. Id. Title 8 U.S.C..§ 1158(a) (1990) provides, in toto:
The Attorney General shall establish a procedure for an alien physically present
in the United States or at a land border or port of entry, irrespective of such
alien's status, to apply for asylum, and the alien may be granted asylum in the
discretion of the Attorney General if the Attorney General determines that such
alien is a refugee within the meaning of section l101(a)(42)(A) of this title.
111. HRC III, 953 F.2d 1498, 1509 (1lth Cir. 1992).
112. Id. at 1509-10.
113. Id. at 1510.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 1510-11.
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"interpretive rules" or "general statements of policy.""' 9 Therefore,
the guidelines do not have the force and effect of law. The guidelines
were intended only to give "guidance to those INS employees in-
volved in the interdiction program." '"2 In concluding its discussion of
the second issue in the case, the court of appeals, in one paragraph,
stated that the plaintiffs' claim of rights under customary interna-
tional law or international common law was "meritless" and did not
"warrant discussion.''
In deciding the third and final issue, the court of appeals de-
cided that HRC had no First Amendment right of access to the Hai-
tian interdictees. The district court erred in granting injunctive relief
based on the First Amendment claim.121 In HRC I, the court of ap-
peals stated that it did not rule on the First Amendment issue be-
cause the district court's order did not address the First Amendment
claim. The district court order barred repatriation, but did not grant
HRC access to the interdictees. 11 3 However, the district court, on
remand, ordered the defendants to grant HRC meaningful access to
the Haitian interdictees limited by reasonable, content-neutral, time,
place and manner restrictions. The court of appeals ruled that the
plaintiffs had failed to state a claim upon which relief might be
granted. 24 Since Haitians outside the United States have no cogni-
zable legal rights under the law or Constitution, it would be "non-
sensical to find that HRC possesses a right of access to the inter-
dicted Haitians for the purpose of advising them of their legal
rights."' 1 5 The court explained that even though NAACP v. But-
ton '2 and In re Prim us'1 7 recognized the narrow right of counsel to
associate for the purpose 'of litigation in the exercise of political
speech, the right was based on underlying legal claims that could be
asserted by the potential plaintiffs.' 28
In addition, the court of appeals stated that even if HRC had a
right to association, no right to access is created thereby. The court
decided that HRC actually was claiming a right to associate with
the interdictees, coupled with a right to require the government to
assist it in the exercise of the right.' 9 There is no affirmative duty,
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. HRC 111, 953 F.2d 1498, 1511 (11th Cir. 1992).
122. Id. at 1511-12.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 1512.
125. Id. at 1513.
126. HRC III, 953 F.2d 1498, 1513 (11th Cir. 1992); N.A.A.C.P. v. Button, 371 U.S.
415 (1963).
127. HRC 111, 953 F.2d 1498, 1513 (1lth Cir. 1992); In re Primus, 436 U.S. 412
(1978).




constitutionally imposed, on the government to facilitate the realiza-
tion of a right. 1 0 The majority of the court noted that neither
NAACP v. Button nor In Re Primus held that the right to associa-
tion is infringed when the government denies access to individuals
who are lawfully in the government's custody. 13' Since the district
court's order applied to interdicted class members on Coast Guard
cutters, the government would be required to incur the substantial
burden of removing the ships from their theater of operation, causing
interference with the interdiction process or allowing private individ-
.uals to board ships during their operation at sea. The government
would be forced to subsidize and assist the plaintiffs. 32 Furthermore,
the majority of the court submitted that the government already was
required to hold the Haitians at Guantanamo Bay at tremendous ex-
pense to the taxpayers. The court of appeals suggested that this ex-
pense would be increased if the government were required to provide
HRC representatives with transportation, lodging, and other necessi-
ties in order that they might exercise an alleged First Amendment
right of access. 33 Finally, the court of appeals cites Ukranian-Amer-
ican Bar Ass'n v. Baker (hereinafter "UABA") 34 in support of its
position. In UABA, the United States Court of Appeals for the Dis-
trict of Columbia Court held:
[W]hen an unadmitted alien is taken into custody for interroga-
tion and 'immediate action,' his entrance into custody does not
infringe the right of any third party - whether a lawyer or an-
other with an interest in getting a message through to the alien
- to engage in constitutionally protected political expression
... . Furthermore, the Government does not infringe a third
party's first amendment right to associate with an alien by hold-
ing the alien for a period of time during which the third party is
unable to contact him. The loss of the right of association while
the alien is held incommunicado by the Government is not of
constitutional significance; it is but an indirect consequence of
the Government's pursuit of an important task, viz. resolving
'immediate action' cases.'
3 5
Thus, the majority laid to rest HRC's First Amendment claim of
access to the interdicted Haitians.
As was the case in HRC I and HRC II, Judge Hatchett was the
sole dissenter. Judge Hatchett summarizes what he considered to be
130. Id.
131. Id. at 1514.
132. Id.
133. HRC III, 953 F.2d 1498, 1514 (11th Cir. 1992).
134. HRC 111, 953 F.2d 1498, 1514 (11th Cir. 1992); Ukranian-American Bar Ass'n,
Inc. v. Baker, 893 F.2d 1374 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
135. HRC III, 953 F.2d 1498, 1514 (11th Cir. 1992); Ukranian-American Bar Ass'n,
Inc. v. Baker, 893 F.2d 1374, 1381 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
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the essence of the majority's opinion:
The majority cites many cases for many legal propositions, but
when all is said and done, the majority simply accepts the gov-
ernment's contention that these refugees have no enforceable
rights in an American court because they have not reached the
continental United States . . . . [a]lthough everyone in the case
agrees that agencies of the United States captured the refugees
and are holding them on United States vessels and leased terri-
tory. Moreover, the majority accepts this argument although ev-
eryone in the case agrees that the refugees are being prevented
from reaching the shores of the continental United States.'
Judge Hatchett stated that the principal issues before the Court
were (1) whether the interdictees had enforceable rights of review
under the APA, and (2) whether HRC possessed a valid First
Amendment claim of access to the interdictees for the purpose of
advising and counseling them. He contended that both issues were
resolved correctly by the district court in favor of the plaintiffs. 137
Prior to addressing the preceding issues, Judge Hatchett criticized
the court of appeals because rather than considering the appropriate-
ness of the district court's entry of injunctive relief, the majority pro-
ceeded as if they were required to decide the issues on the merits. 38
He accused the majority of determining the issues on appeal as if
they were "purely matters of law," and for failing to adequately
evaluate the district court's factual findings.
13 9
Judge Hatchett argued that HRC had demonstrated a valid
First Amendment right of access claim to the Haitian refugees. He
agreed with the majority's position that HRC's right of access did
not require the government to allow HRC aboard U.S. Coast Guard
cutters. Nevertheless, he believed that the teachings of Jean v. Nel-
son supported HRC's First Amendment right as counsel to inform
clients of their legal rights where counsel does so as an act of politi-
cal expression without compensation. 4 1 Judge Hatchett further con-
tended that the holding of Jean does not predicate HRC's right of
access on the existence of specific underlying rights possessed by the
Haitians. 4 2 The district court found that Guantanamo Bay was re-
plete with civilian activities, though it is was a nonpublic forum.
43
Restrictions may be applied by the government; but these restric-
136. HRC II1, 953 F.2d 1498, 1515 (1lth Cir. 1992).
137. Id.
138. Id. at 1516.
139. Id.
140. Id.; Jean v. Nelson, 727 F.2d 957 (lth Cir. 1984) (en banc).
141. HRC 111, 953 F.2d 1498, 1516-17 (1lth Ci. 1992).




tions must be reasonable in light of the purpose that the forum
serves.1" ' The government's mere opposition to the speaker's point of
view is not adequate justification for restricting access to a nonpublic
forum.
1 5
Judge Hatchett stated that the record revealed the government
was engaging in content-based discrimination against HRC. The
government had allowed television reporters, congressmen, political
activists, church officials, representatives of the United Nations High
Commissioner on Refugees, and other individuals and groups to visit
the Haitians. Yet, the government refused access to HRC lawyers
who desired to counsel the refugees as to their legal rights."4 6 The
section of the base where the Haitians were being held was not used
for military purposes. Therefore, the district court did not abuse its
discretion by granting access to HRC, subject to "appropriate time,




Contrary to the majority's suggestion, Judge Hatchett observed
that there was no evidence in the record that the government would
be forced to provide HRC transportation, shelter, and necessities to
actualize its right of access to Haitians at Guantanamo Bay. The
majority could not make new findings of fact. The majority was lim-
ited to those factual findings reflected in the record created below.14
Judge Hatchett stated that lawyers must have access to their clients
to advise them of their potential rights, even if the clients have no
rights or causes of action. The lawyer has the right to advise such a
client of all of his options." 9 The majority of the court deprived the
French-speaking Haitians of lawyers in a circumstance "affecting
their most fundamental interests" because the court made the deter-
mination that the Haitians had no rights that might justify the ad-
vice of counsel.
1 50
Judge Hatchett also asserted that the Haitians had a right to
judicial review of the President's subordinates' actions in failing to
follow INS Guidelines and procedures. He was critical of the major-
ity's conclusion that the requirements of the APA did not apply to
aliens outside the borders of the United States. 151 Judge Hatchett
initially focused on 5 U.S.C. § 702. Title 5 of U.S.C. § 702 provides,
in relevant part, that "[a] person suffering legal wrong because of
agency action, or adversely affected or aggrieved by agency action
144. Id. (citing Perry Education Ass'n v. Perry Local Education Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 49
(1984)).
145. Id.





151. HRC 111, 953 F.2d 1498, 1519 (11th Cir. 1992).
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within the meaning of a relevant statute, is entitled to judicial review
thereof."152 Judge Hatchett suggested that the language of the stat-
ute does not require that a "person be a citizen of the United
States. ' 15- The plaintiffs should not be precluded from bringing suit,
since the language of the provision does not require that the "per-
son" be a citizen. 154 He then points to the decisional law to support
his interpretation of 5 U.S.C. § 702.15' The requirements of § 702
had been met by the plaintiffs because they had "suffered legal
wrong" because of the actions of low-ranking governmental officials
who failed to properly interview them. 15 This failure to comply with
Executive Order 12324 with its implementing INS guidelines re-
sulted in the return of Haitians to their homeland when they might
well have qualified as political refugees.' 57 Accepting the 1967 Pro-
tocol as self-executing, Judge Hatchett contended that these low-
ranking, governmental officials had violated the 1967 Protocol, which
is applicable on the high seas to Haitians, by returning refugees to
Haiti. 5 ' He argued that because the refugees were forcibly returned
to Haiti by INS low-ranking officials, final agency action had oc-
curred within the meaning of 5 U.S.C. § 704. The Haitians had no
other adequate remedy in a domestic court.' 59 Consequently, the
agency action was reviewable pursuant to §§ 702 and 704 of the
APA.
Judge Hatchett rejected the majority's position that agency a c-
tion was not reviewable pursuant to 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(1) and §
701(a)(2). Citing several cases, Judge Hatchett reasserted his posi-
tion that the conduct of low-ranking, governmental officials with the
duty of screening interdictees may be reviewed pursuant to the
APA.'6 0 Judicial review is not barred unless the legislative intent is
clear. Nothing in the 1967 Protocol, Executive Order 12324, or INS
Guidelines preclude judicial review.'"" Again, Judge Hatchett reiter-
ated his position that Article 33 of the Protocol is not only self-exe-
cuting, but also applies extraterritorially. 6
The majority opinion concluded that the refugees had no private
right of action. Judge Hatchett contended that the majority's posi-
tion failed because the refugees did not seek judicial review of the
152. Id.; 5 U.S.C. § 702 (1976).
153. HRC 111, 953 F.2d 1498, 1519 (11th Cir. 1992).
154. Id.
155. Id. at 1519-20.
156. Id. at 1520.
157. Id.
158. HRC 111, 953 F.2d 1498, 1520 (11th Cir. 1992).






denial of particular asylum claims. The refugees challenged the con-
duct of low-level, executive officials who failed to follow INS Guide-
lines promulgated pursuant to Executive Order 12324.13 Judge
Hatchett stated that the preceding contention is supported by the
holding of Jean v. Nelson where the court of appeals decided that
although it had no power to evaluate individual deportation orders, it
had the authority to determine whether the conduct of low-level,
governmental officials comported with the requirements of executive
policy.",
Judge Hatchett found that no presidential or congressional in-
tent to bar judicial review of the conduct of subordinate, governmen-
tal officials was discernible in any of the laws relating to the interdic-
tion of Haitians on the high seas. 165 The President, through
Executive Order 12324, required that the immigration laws of the
United States be applied and enforced on the high seas against Hai-
tians. "This exportation of laws also constitutes an exportation of
rights and duties. These rights and duties are detailed in the Protocol
and the Executive Order."' 6 Accordingly, Judge Hatchett submitted
that § 701(a)(1) of the APA was not applicable to the case; no rele-
vant statute or law precluded judicial review.'
6 7
Judge Hatchett concluded his opinion by rejecting the major-
ity's view that judicial review was precluded by § 701(a)(2) of the
APA. Section 701(a)(2) denies a plaintiff review of agency action
where a decision is committed to agency discretion.'6 8 The majority
of the court held that it had no meaningful guidelines that provided
a standard for evaluating the action of subordinate INS officials' dis-
cretion. The majority admitted that a court might review agency ac-
tion committed to its discretion, if the agency failed to follow its own
regulations.'6 9 Judge Hatchett argued that the INS Guidelines pro-
vided a standard for judicial review. The INS Guidelines state that
they are based on Article 33 of the 1967 Protocol and Executive
Order No. 12324.170 The majority ruled that the INS Guidelines
provided no meaningful standards for judicial review and that the
decisions of low-level INS, officials were committed to agency discre-
tion by the APA. Hence, the complete disposition of the HRC tril-
ogy was effected by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh
Circuit.
163. HRC III, 953 F.2d 1498, 1522 (11th Cir. 1992).
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. Id. at 1523.
167. Id.
168. HRC III, 953 F.2d 1498, 1523 (11th Cir. 1992).
169. Id.
170. Id. at 1523-24.
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II. Analysis of HRC I, HRC II, and HRC III
The case of Haitian Refugee Center, Inc. v. James Baker, III,
might best be characterized as the Dred Scott case of immigration
law. In Dred Scott v. Sandford,17 1 the United States Supreme Court
(hereinafter "Supreme Court"), through Chief Justice Taney, de-
cided that the temporary residence of a slave, Dred Scott, in free
territory did not free him under the common law doctrine articulated
in Somerset v. Stewart.17 2 Lord Mansfield in Somerset held that a
slave was sui juris, a free man, once he entered a jurisdiction that
did not acknowledge slavery, even though the slave escaped and was
recaptured by the master. 17 13 The Supreme Court decided that the
federal courts which heard Dred Scott's claim did not have jurisdic-
tion to determine his claim.1 74 Slaves were not citizens within the
meaning of the Constitution and therefore did not enjoy the rights,
privileges and immunities guaranteed those who were citizens of the
United States. Slaves were property owned by their masters.17 5 The
most famous passage from the decision states:
They had for more than a century before been regarded as be-
ings of an inferior order, and altogether unfit to associate with
the white race either in social or political relations; and so far
inferior that they had no rights which the white man was bound
to respect; and that the negro might justly and lawfully be re-
duced to slavery for his benefit . . . . This opinion was at that
time fixed and universal in the civilized portion of the white
race. It was regarded as an axiom in morals as well as in polit-
ics, which no one thought of disputing, or supposed to be open to
dispute; and men in every grade and position in society daily and
habitually acted upon it in their private pursuits, as well as in
matters of public concern, without doubting for a moment the
correctness of the opinion.1
76
The Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit essentially held that
Haitian refugees, though seized by the United States on the high
seas, have no substantive legal rights under the Constitution which a
domestic court is bound to accept. Like fugitive slaves, these refu-
gees have been returned to their symbolically political masters with a
clear and probable consequence of punishment, persecution, or
death. There is probative evidence that such persecution and death
has occurred. 77
171. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1854).
172. Somerset v. Stewart, 98 Eng. Rep. 499 (K.B. 1772).
173. Id. at 510.
174. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 454 (1854).
175. Id. at 451-52.
176. Id. at 407.
177. See H.W. French, Some Haitians Say Continuing Abuses Forced a 2D Flight,
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Unlike the Supreme Court's opinion in Dred Scott v. Sandford,
the court of appeals opinions in HRC I and HRC H provide legal
conclusions supported by scant analysis."' 8 In HRC I, the court of
appeals devotes two paragraphs to its discussion of Article 33 of the
1967 Protocol. The court summarily concluded, without analysis,
that the provision was not self-executing. The plaintiffs had no cog-
nizable legal rights pursuant to Article 33. It is impossible for one to
know why the court of appeals decided that Article 33 was not self-
executing because the majority of the Court fails to supply a princi-
pled or reasoned basis for its decision-making. Judge Hatchett in his
dissenting opinion argued that Article 33 of the 1967 Protocol is
self-executing and applies extraterritorially. His position is the better
viewpoint. Judge Hatchett's position relies on the law as set forth in
United States v. Postal. The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
there held:
The question whether a treaty is self-executing is a matter of
interpretation for the courts when the issue presents itself in liti-
gation . . . and, as in the case of all matters of treaty interpre-
tation, the courts attempt to discern the intent of the parties to
the agreement so as to carry out their manifest purpose ....
The self-executing question is perhaps one of the most con-
founding in treaty law.'
79
It is the general consensus that it is necessary to consider to several
N.Y. TIMEs, Feb. 10, 1992, at Al (Forty-two refugees forcibly returned to Haiti told United
Nations officials of "beatings, imprisonment, death threats and other abuses that prompted
them to flee their country a second time."); see H.W. French, U.N. Finds Haitians Who Fled
Anew, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 16, 1992, at A3; Court Lets Haitian Repatriation Go On, WASH.
POST, Feb. 12, 1992, at A9 (Lawyers' Committee for Human Rights released transcripts of
interviews with 10 Haitian refugees who had returned to Guantanamo Bay after repatriation.
These refugees related stories of beatings, shootings, persecution of family members causing
them to flee again.). But see U.S. Argues for Continued Return of Haitians, WASH. POST, Feb.
15, 1992, at A5 (U.S. denies refugees who returned to Haiti were persecuted; lawyers of repa-
triated refugees stated, "U.S. officials knew, but did not tell [sic] Supreme Court that some
returnees had been 'tortured, killed or persecuted' for fleeing the country .... ").
178. It is interesting to note that although the court of appeals' decisions in HRC I and
HRC If are devoid of legal analysis or reasoning, appellate courts have consistently required
reasoned explanations of decision-making from governmental agencies. The underlying bases
for a requirement of reasoned decisions are self-evident. The appellate court must be presented
with sufficient explanations or analysis so that it may properly review the agency's exercise of
authority or discretion. The requirement of reasoned decisions also informs both the appellate
court and the aggrieved party of the grounds upon which the governmental action was taken.
The aggrieved party to the suit may then better plan a potential legal response. See Matlovich
v. Secretary of Air Force, 591 F.2d 852, 857 (D.C. Cir. 1978) and cases cited therein; see,
e.g., United States v. Chicago, M., St. P & P.R.R., 294 U.S. 499, 510-11 (1935) ("We must
know what a decision means before the duty becomes ours to say whether it is a right or
wrong."); SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 196-97 (1947) ("It will not do for a court to
be compelled to guess at the theory underlying the agency's action .... "); see also Baltimore
& Ohio R.R. v. Aberdeen & Rockfish R.R., 393 U.S. 87, 92 (1968); Citizens to Preserve
Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 420 (1971); Bowman Transportation, Inc. v. Arkansas-
Best Freight System, Inc., 419 U.S. 281, 285-86 (1974); Dunlop v. Backowski, 421 U.S. 560,
571-74 (1975); Kleppe v. Delta Mining, Inc., 423 U.S. 403, 409 (1976).
179. United States v. Postal, 589 F.2d 862, 876 (5th Cir. 1979).
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factors in determining whether a treaty is self-executing or directly
applicable in domestic law. In determining self-execution, courts
consider the intent of the parties, the treaty's legislative history, ne-
gotiations, and the subsequent judicial construction of the parties. 180
In the instant case, the weight of the evidence is clearly in favor
of self-execution or direct applicability as suggested by Judge Hatch-
ett. The strongest evidence in favor of the self-executing nature of
the 1967 Protocol is its legislative history and its subsequent domes-
tic construction. During the Senate deliberations on the 1967 Proto-
col, the State Department stated that no domestic legislation was
required to implement the 1967 Protocol.18 Congress adhered to the
belief that no amendment to the Immigration and Nationality Act
was necessary to comply with the Protocol's provisions.' 82 In addi-
tion, the Senate committee report which recommended accession to
the 1967 Protocol suggested that the United States would be auto-
matically bound to apply articles 2 through 34 of the convention.
1 8 3
The subsequent judicial constructions of the 1967 Protocol also mili-
tate in favor of a conclusion that the 1967 Protocol is self-execut-
ing."8 The Board of Immigration Appeals in Matter of Dunbar de-
scribed the 1967 Protocol as self-executing.' 8 5 Also, it is worth
noting that the INS Guidelines specifically refer to Article 33 of the
180. Id. at 877; A.D. King, Interdiction: The United States' Continuing Violation of
International Law, 68 BOSTON U.L. REV. 780, 781 (1988); YuJI IWASAWA, THE DOCTRINE OF
SELF-EXECUTING TREATIES IN THE UNITED STATES: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS 627, 653-86 ( ); see
also A. McNAIR, LAW OF TREATIES 365 (1961); D. O'Connell, I INT'L LAW 271 (1965); see
generally J.H. Jackson, Status of Treaties in Domestic Legal Systems: A Policy Analysis, 86
AM. J. INT'L L. 310, 318 (1992); Jordan J. Paust, Self-Executing Treaties, 82 AM. J. INT'L L.
760 (1988).
181. Abigail D. King, Interdiction: The United States' Continuing Violation of Interna-
tional Law, 68 BOSTON U. L. REV. 773, 785-86 (1988) (citing Cong. Research Serv., Library
of Cong., 96th Cong. 1st Sess., Review of U.S. Refugee Resettlement Programs and Policies at
7, 12, 14 (Comm. Print 1979)); see generally S. REP. No. 256, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 9 (1980),
reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 141, 149.
182. King, supra note 181, at 786.
183. See S. EXEC. REP. No. 14, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. (1968), cited in HRC 1, 949 F.2d
1109, 1114 (11th Cir. 1991).
184. See cases cited in HRC 1, 949 F.2d 1109, 1114-15 (11th Cir. 1991).
185. Matter of Dunbar, No. 2192, at 310, 313-14 (Bd. of Immigration App.) Apr. 17,
1973 [hereinafter BIA]. The BIA stated, inter alia:
Since it supplements and incorporates the substantive provisions of the Conven-
tion, the Protocol must be regarded as a treaty, which is part of the Supreme
law of the land . . . . Such a treaty, being self-executing, has the force and
effect of an act of Congress ....
Our examination of the legislative materials satisfies us that the United States
Senate, in giving its advice and consent to accession to the Protocol, did not
contemplate that radical changes in existing immigration laws would be effected.
Quite to the contrary, the general representations made to induce affirmative
senate action indicated that our immigration laws already embodied the humane
provisions for refugees fostered by the Convention and Protocol. Accession by
the United States it was asserted, would lend the weight of our moral support to
the measure and would influence other nations with less liberal refugee legisla-
tion to adhere to it.
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1967 Protocol and the 1951 Refugee Convention. The INS Guide-
lines state, in relevant part:
C. INS officers shall be constantly watchful for any indication
(including bare claims) that a person or persons on board the
interdicted vessel may qualify as refugees under the United Na-
tions Convention and Protocol.""8
Under the heading "AUTHORITY," the INS Guidelines provide:
4. Article 33, United Nations Convention and Protocol Relating
to the Status of Refugees.
1 87
Moreover, Executive Order 12324 states that in actions taken
beyond the territorial waters of the United States "no person who is
a refugee will be returned without his consent."1"8 Executive Order
12324 admonishes the Attorney General to strictly observe "our in-
ternational obligations concerning those who genuinely flee persecu-
tion . .1.8."I9 Both the INS Guidelines and Executive Order 12324
support the position that compliance with Article 33 is mandatory.
186. See INS GUIDELINES, supra note 17.
187. Id. Section 1101 of the Refugee Act of 1980 defines the term "refugee." The defi-
nition of refugee under the 1980 Refugee Act mirrors the definition of "refugee" as defined in
Article 1 of the 1967 Protocol. 8 U.S.C. §1101 (K)(42) (1992 Cumulative Annual Pocket
Part) provides, inter alia:
The term "refugee" means (A) any person who is outside any country of such
person's nationality or, in the case of a person having no nationality, is outside
any country in which such person last habitually resided, and who is unable or
unwilling to return to, and is unable or unwilling to avail himself and herself of
the protection of, that country because of persecution or a well-founded fear of
persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular
social group, or political opinion, or (B) in such special circumstances as the
President after appropriate consultation (as defined in section 1157(e) of this
title) may specify, any person who is within the country of such person's nation-
ality or, in the case of a person having no nationality, within the country in
which such person is habitually residing and who is persecuted or who has a
well-founded fear of persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, mem-
bership in a particular social group, or political opinion. The term "refugee"
does not include any person who ordered, incited, assisted, or otherwise partici-
pated in the persecution of any person on account of race, religion, nationality,
membership in a particular social group, or political opinion.
Compare art. I, 1967 Protocol, supra note 18. It has been asserted that the 1980 Refugee Act
"conforms asylum and section 243(h) procedures to the definition of refugee" as it is memori-
alized in the 1967 Protocol. A. Stepick, Haitian Boat People: A Study in the Conflicting
Forces Shaping U.S. Immigration Policy, 45 Law and Contemporary Problems 163, 173
(1982); see I C. Gordon & H. Rosenfeld, Immigration Law & Procedure § 2-188.17 (rev. ed.
1982). The fact that the 1980 Refugee Act has provisions which reflect standards found in the
1967 Protocol is evidence that the drafters of the 1980 Refugee Act were attempting to imple-
ment the international obligations of the United States under the 1967 Protocol by promulgat-
ing the 1980 Refugee Act.
188. Executive Order 12,324, § 2(c)3, supra at note 16.
189. Id. Section 3 of Executive Order 12,324 provides, in toto:
The Attorney General shall in consultation with the Secretary of State and the
Secretary of The Department in which the Coast Guard is operating, take
whatever steps are necessary to ensure the fair enforcement of our laws relating
to immigration. . .and the strict observance of our international obligations con-
cerning those who genuinely flee persecution in their homeland.
28 DICKINSON JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
Thus, it .is reasonable to conclude that Article 33 is self-executing.
There is a view which holds that those treaties which create in-
dividuals rights and duties are self-executing. 0 Apparently, the
United States Court for the Eleventh Circuit shares this view. 91 In
United States v. Bent-Santana,'92 the court of appeals stated:
It is settled principle of both public international and American
constitutional law that unless a treaty or intergovernmental
agreement is self-executing - that is, unless it expressly creates
privately enforceable rights - an individual citizen does not
have standing to protest where one nation does not follow the
terms of such agreement. 193
Article 33 of the 1967 Protocol creates the individual right of
nonrefoulement. The court of appeals overlooked its own decision.
However, it must be reiterated that the court of appeals, in its brev-
ity, failed to disclose the underlying basis for its decision that Article
33 was not self-executing. It is, therefore, difficult to criticize its con-
clusion. Nonetheless, whether one considers the 1967 Protocol self-
executing or denies that it is self-executing, one should not allow the
"tyranny of terminology" to annul international treaty obligations.
The United States is no less bound by those norms articulated in the
1967 Protocol. As a party to the 1967 Protocol, the United States
has agreed to comply with the provisions stated therein. As a matter
of fundamental fairness, justice, and good faith, the government
should not now be heard to argue that it is not bound to comply with
a provision of a treaty because there is -no implementing legislation.
If implementing legislation was necessary to give domestic, legal ef-
fect to the 1967 Protocol, the United States should have passed such
legislation within a reasonable time of its adherence to the treaty in
1968. The Reporter's Notes to § 111 of Restatement 3rd of Foreign
Relations Law of the United States suggests that the United States
is obliged to comply with the provisions of a treaty at the moment it
comes into force. 94 A failure or delay on the part of the United
States to take the appropriate action to implement a treaty may con-
stitute a breach of the government's international obligation.'sa The
Restatement Third specifically provides that,
if the Executive Branch has not requested implementing legisla-
tion and Congress has not enacted such legislation, there is a
strong presumption that the treaty has been considered self-exe-
190. Y. Iwasawa, supra note 173, at 646-49.
191. Id.
192. United States v. Bent-Santana, 774 F.2d 1545 (11th Cir. 1985).
193. Id. at 1550.





cuting by the political branch, and should be considered self-
executing by the courts. (This is especially so if some time has
elapsed since the treaty has come into force. In that event, a
finding that a treaty is not self-executing is a finding that the
United States has been and continues to be in default [of its
international obligation] and should be avoided. 9 "
The 1967 Protocol has been an international obligation of the United
States for the past 24 years. The government's dilatory behavior has
resulted in a failure to promulgate implementing legislation. To con-
done such state conduct vitiates the sanctity of the treaty negotiation
process and the value of international law.
Article 26 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties
197
provides that "[e]very treaty in force is binding upon the parties to it
and must be performed by them in good faith." 198 The preceding
legal norm codifies the fundamental principle of international law
governing the observance and sanctity of treaties, pacta sunt ser-
vanda.1 99 Judge Lauterpacht of the International Court of Justice
stated in the Norwegian Loans case: "Unquestionably, the obligation
to act in accordance with good faith, being a general principle of
law, is also part of international law."'20 0 Article 27 of the Vienna
Convention states that "[a] party may not invoke the provisions of
its internal law as justification of its failure to perform a treaty."201
Also, the Vienna Convention provides that a state is obligated to re-
frain from behavior which would defeat the object and purpose of a
196. Id. at 53-54. It is interesting to note that in the case of the North American Free
Trade Agreement, the president will submit enabling or implementing legislation after con-
gressional hearings and negotiations have been concluded. The Congress will be given 90 days
to pass the legislation. E.J. Dionne, Clinton to Support NAFTA but Wants Aid for Displaced
Workers, WASH. POST, Oct. 3, 1992, 10A. This "fast track" approach could have been used to
promulgate legislation to implement the 1967 Protocol.
197. U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 39/27 (1969), reprinted in 63 AM. J. INT'L L. 875 (1969), 8
Int'l Leg. Mat. 679. (1969), signed at Vienna May 23, 1969, entered into force January 27,
1980 [hereinafter "Vienna Convention"]. The United States is not a party to the Vienna Con-
vention. However, the Vienna Convention codifies customary international law. See opinion of
the International Law Commission, 2 Yearbook of International Law Commission 177 (1966).
The U.S State Department has described the Vienna Convention as "the authoritative guide to
current treaty law and practice." S. Exec. Doc. L., 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971), at 1. The
Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States "accepts the Vienna
Convention as, in general, constituting a codification of the customary international law gov-
erning international agreements and therefore as foreign relations law of the United States
even though the United States has not adhered to the convention." Restatement 3rd of the
Foreign Relations Law of the United States, Part III, International Agreements, at 145
(1986). See also Frankowska, The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties Before United
States Courts, 28 VA. J. INTL. L. 281 (1988).
198. Vienna Convention, supra note 197, at art. 26.
199. W.W. BISHOP, INTERNATIONAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 23 (3rd ed. 1971)
("Pact sunt servanda becomes more and more the most important rule of international law);
Kunz, Meaning and Range of the Norm "Pacta Sunt Servanda," 39 Am. J. INTL. L. 180
(1945); CARTER AND TRIMBLE, INTERNATIONAL LAW 12, 88, 96 (1991).
•200. I.C.J. Reports 9, 53 (1957).
201. Vienna Convention, supra note 197, at art. 27(1).
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treaty, if the state has either signed the treaty or has exchanged in-
struments of ratification, acceptance, or approval. 02 The Permanent
Court of Internationaal Justice held that "a state cannot adduce as
against another state its own Constitution with a view to evading
obligations incumbent upon it under international law or treaties in
force."20 Thus, the United States cannot invoke the internal or do-
mestic rule of non-self-execution to justify the failure to enforce Ar-
ticle 33 of the 1967 Protocol, a treaty it has ratified. The govern-
ment's argument that it is not bound to enforce the treaty obligation
because the 1967 Protocol is not self-executing constitutes a failure
of the United States government to act in good faith and violates the
- international norm of pacta sunt servanda. Article VI, clause 2, of
the United States Constitution provides that treaties are a part of
the supreme law of the land. The judiciary is legally required to en-
force these international obligations. It is not textually demonstrable
that the self-execution rule is an exception to the preceding constitu-
tionally mandated, legal principle.
20 4
The court of appeals, in its effort to "expedite disposition of the
appeal, ' 20 5 disregarded the well-reasoned amicus curiae brief filed
by the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refu-
gees (hereinafter "the High Commissioner"). The High Commis-
sioner argued that Article 33 of the 1967 Protocol memorializes an
independent fundamental right, exclusive of any question of admis-
sion to the United States territory or the grant of asylum. 06 The
High Commissioner further argued that Article 33 guarantees that
no refugees will be returned to the frontiers of a country where they
may be persecuted or murdered and its prohibition applies extrater-
ritorially on the high seas.20 7 Where the refugees are intercepted, is
202. Id. at art. 18.
203. P.C.I.J. Reports, ser A/B, no. 44, at 24 (1932). See Greco-Bulgarian Communi-
ties, P.C.I.J. Reports, ser. B. no. 17, at 32. ("It is a generally accepted principle of interna-
tional law that in relations between Powers who are contracting Parties to a treaty, the provi-
sions of municipal law cannot prevail over those of the treaty.").
204. See Note, Self-Execution of Treaties Under the United States Constitution, 26
COLUM. L. REV. 859, 860 (1926) ("treaties are always self-executory"); see also Paust, supra
note 173, at 760:
The distinction found in certain cases between 'self-executing' and 'non-self-exe-
cuting' treaties is a judicially invented notion that is patently inconsistent with
the express language of the Constitution affirming that 'all Treaties . . . shall be
the supreme law of the Land.' Indeed, such a distinction may involve the most
glaring of attempts to deviate from the specific text of the Constitution. For
some 40 years after the formation of the Constitution, President George Wash-
ington's recognition in 1796 that "every Treaty [properly ratified] . . . thence-
forward becomes the law of the land was widely shared."
205. HRC I, 949 F.2d 1109, 1111 n.l (I1th Cir. 1991). The Court stated: "This brief
opinion is filed in order to expedite disposition of the appeal. No supplemental opinion will be
filed."
206. Brief of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees in Sup-





Article 33 identifies the place to which no refugee may be sent,
no exception is provided that conditions the obligation on the
place from which a refugee is returned. The obligation arises
wherever the government acts.
20 9
The High Commissioner began its discussion by demonstrating
that international law is a part of the law of the United States.2 "
The domestic courts of the United States are bound by international
common law or customary international law.2 11 The principle of
nonrefoulement is embodied in the 1951 Refugee Convention, and
the 1967 Protocol 'and is a customary rule of international law.
21 2
Consequently, the United States is legally obligated to observe these
international legal norms. The High Commissioner noted that none
of the parties to the 1967 Protocol have made reservations thereto.
2 1 3
The High Commissioner observed that reservations to Article 33 are
prohibited by Article 42 of the 1951 Refugee Convention and Article
7 of the 1967 Protocol.2 1 4 The High Commissioner revealed that the
United States has supported the universal application of the princi-
ple of nonrefoulement by stating:
[O]n November 25, 1974, U.S. Representative Clarence Clyde
Ferguson, Jr. made a statement to the Third Committee of the
U.N. General Assembly concerning the subject of refoulement.
Ambassador Ferguson stated:
'Once again my government wishes to stress, in this fo-
rum, the overriding importance among the High Com-
missioner's manifold activities of his function of provid-
ing inter national protection for refugees. It is difficult
to overemphasize the significance to refugees of ensur-
ing liberal asylum policies and practices, and above all
in making certain that no refugee is required to return
to any country where he would face persecution. It is
the High Commissioner's task to work unceasingly to-
ward affording such guarantee. His chief tools in so do-
ing are the 1951 Convention and the 1967 Protocol Re-
lating to the Status of Refugees. As the Committee
knows, Article 33 of the Convention contains an une-
quivocal prohibition upon contracting states against the
refoulement of refugees in any manner whatsoever to
208. Id.
209. Id.
210. Id. at 5.
211. Brief of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees in Sup-
port of Appellees, amicus curiae at 6 (Dec. 11, 1991).
212. Id. at 7.
213. Id.
214. Id. at 10.
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territories where their life or freedom would be
threatened on grounds of race, religion, nationality,
membership of [in] a particular social group or political
opinion.
My government joins with the High Commissioner
in condemning the inhumane practice of refoulement.
The principle that refugees must not be repatriated
against their will, and the right of a refugee to seek and
secure asylum, have become even more firmly embed-
ded international law.'2 "
Additionally, the High Commissioner concluded that the principle of
nonrefoulement is an absolute obligation with no territorial limita-
tions. No limitation appears in the text of Article 33.21' Again, the
High Commissioner stated:
It is significant that the principle of non-refoulement - perhaps
the foremost principle of international law protecting refugees
- is stated in mandatory terms as an absolute obligation, and
that no territorial limitation appears in the language of Article
33. When the drafters of the 1951 Convention as a whole wished
to condition the rights of refugees on their physical location or
residence, they did so expressly in the language of the treaty.
Thus, in the article on the separate matter of 'expulsion' imme-
diately preceding Article 33, the 1951 Convention expressly lim-
its the scope of the right to 'a refugee' lawfully in the territory
. . . .' Article 4 on freedom of religion and 27 on the issuance
of travel documents state, also expressly, that States' obligations
under these articles are limited to refugees who are present in
the territory of the State. Article 18 on rights to self-employ-
ment and 26 on freedom of movement clearly state that their
scope is limited to refugees lawfully on the territory of the Con-
tracting State. Similarly, Articles 15, 17(1), 19, 21, 23, 24, and
28 (regarding, respectively, rights related to association, employ-
ment, exercise of the liberal professions, housing, public relief,
labor conditions, and travel documents) all are expressly condi-
tioned on the refugee's legal status on [sic] the territory of the
State. In stark contrast to all of these provisions, Article 33 con-
tains no such restriction. To the contrary, Article 33 prohibits
the return of refugees 'in any manner whatsoever.'
2 1 7
In supporting its interpretation that the 1967 Protocol applies extra-
territorially, the High Commissioner relied on the statement of
United States delegate, Louis Henkin, who stated:
215. Brief of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees in Sup-
port of Appellees, amicus curiae at 10-11 (Dec. 11, 1991).




The Committee had, it was true, decided to delete the chapter
on admittance, considering that the convention should not deal
with the right of asylum and that it should merely provide for a
certain number of improvements in the position of refugees. It
did not, however, follow that the convention would not apply to
persons fleeing from persecution who asked to enter the territory
of the contracting parties. Whether it was a question of closing
the frontier to a refugee who asked admittance, or of turning
him back after he had crossed the frontier, or even of expelling
him after he had been admitted to residence in the territory, the
problem was more or less the same. Whatever the case might be,
whether or not the refugee was in a regular position, he must
not be turned back to a country where his life or freedom could
be threatened. No consideration of public order should be al-
lowed to overrule that guarantee, for if the State concerned
wished to get rid of the refugee at all costs, it could send him to
another country or place him in an internment camp.2 18
Finally, the High Commissioner stated that the United States
responded to the Indochinese "boat people" by granting political
asylum and resettling them, with few exceptions. 2 19 In its report to
Congress for Fiscal Year 1984, the Office of the U.S. Coordinator of
Refugees' Affairs of the State Department advised that
"[d]espite the heavy burden often imposed by enormous num-
bers of refugees, asylum countries generally have not forcibly
repatriated refugees against their will to countries [from] which
they have fled."
220
Accordingly, as suggested by Judge Hatchett, only Haitian refugees
are intercepted at sea and forced to return to their country of origin
where they may suffer persecution or death. The United States gov-
ernment might attempt to justify its interdiction procedure pursuant
to the bilateral treaty which permits interdiction. This treaty was
concluded between the United States and the notorious Duvalier re-
gime.2 1 In light of the presence of an illegal military junta which
has overthrown the democratic Aristide goyernment, the United
States government should not use this bilateral agreement as justifi-
cation for returning refugees to a regime that the United States has
condemned and is now subjecting to economic sanctions. Such a bi-
218. Id. at 18.
219. Id. at 20.
220. Brief of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees in Sup-
port of Appellees, amicus curiae at 20 (Dec. 11, 1991); see OFFICE OF THE U.S. COORDINATOR
FOR REFUGEE AFFAIRS, PROPOSED REFUGEE ADMISSIONS AND ALLOCATION FOR FISCAL YEAR
1984. REPORT TO CONGRESS FOR FISCAL YEAR 1984 12 (1983).
221. HRC 1, 949 F.2d 1109, 1111 (1lth Cir. 1991); HRC III, 953 F.2d 1498, 1515,
1516 n.2 (1 th Cir. 1992); see generally Interdiction Agreement, Sept. 23, 1981, U.S.-Haiti,
T.I.A.S. No..10,241.
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lateral treaty conflicts with the customary international norm of
nonrefoulement. The norm of nonrefoulement is a human rights
norm and is jus cogens.22 2 There can be no derogation from such a
norm unless it is supplanted by a peremptory norm223 of equal im-
portance on the international normative hierarchy. Thus, the court of
appeals inadequately justified its ruling that Article 33 of the 1967
Protocol is not self-executing or directly applicable.
In HRC I, the court of appeals further decided that the plain-
tiffs' First Amendment claim of access to the interdictees could not
support injunctive relief granted by the district court, since the dis-
trict court did not predicate its decision on this claim or require the
defendants to allow HRC access to the detained Haitians. The court
of appeals did not reach the First Amendment issue. Perhaps, the
failure of the district court to order the defendants to allow the HRC
access to the interdicted Haitians was a simple matter of oversight.
The district court did hold that there was a substantial likelihood
that the plaintiffs would succeed on the First Amendment claim at
trial. The court of appeals analysis is sound on this issue. The error
was that of the district court.
Furthermore, the district court failed to grant the plaintiffs re-
lief on its claim that the APA provided judicially enforceable rights.
The court of appeals held that because the plaintiffs did not cross-
appeal on the denial of the APA claim, it could not properly uphold
injunctive relief based on the claim. Judge Hatchett argued that the
court of appeals had jurisdiction to resolve all issues raised and de-
cided by the district court. The decision of the court of appeals to
not rule on the APA claim due to plaintiffs' failure to cross-appeal is
a valid procedural practice. Counsel for plaintiffs had the opportu-
222. Sohn, The Human Rights Law of the Charter, 12 TEx. INT'L L. J. 129, 131-32
(1977); T. Jones, Article 4 of the International Con- vention on the Elimination of All Forms
of Racial Discrimination and the First Amendment, 23 How. L.J. 429, 436-37 (1980); King,
supra note 180, at 792; see also 1985 Report of the United Nations High Commissioner for
Refugees, at 1 22-23, U.N. Doc. E/1985/62 (1985); 1. BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC
INTERNATIONAL LAW 512-13 (2d ed. 1973) (peremptory norms of international law or jus
cogens "are rules of customary law which cannot be set aside by treaty or acquiescence but
only by formation of a subsequent customary rule of contrary effect").
Article 53 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 39/37
(1969), provides:
A treaty is void, if at the time of its conclusion, it conflicts with a peremptory
norm of general international law. For the purpose of the present Convention, a
peremptory norm of general international law is a norm accepted and recognized
by the international community of States as a whole as a norm from which no
derogation is permitted and which can be modified only by a subsequent norm of
general, international law having the same character.
See generally Schwarzenberger, International Jus Cogens, 43 TEx. L. REV. 455 (1965), Ver-
dross, Jus Dispositivum and Jus Cogens in International Law, 60 AM. J. INT'L L. 55 (1966);
Schwelb, Some Aspects of International Jus Cogens as Formulated by the International Law
Commission, 61 AM. J. INT'L L. 946 (1967).
223. 1. BROWNLIE, supra note 222, at 512-13, Vienna Convention on The Law of Trea-
ties, supra note 222, at art. 53.
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nity to cross-appeal on this issue and did not do so. It is impossible to
know whether counsel for plaintiffs failed to cross-appeal because of
a view that its position on the APA claim was not strong or whether
the failure to cross-appeal was due to neglect. Nevertheless, it was
plaintiffs' counsel's duty to cross-appeal. Having not cross-appealed,
the plaintiffs cannot be heard to complain of the court of appeals'
refusal to consider the issue, sua sponte.
In HRC II, the court of appeals was again faced with the APA
claim when the district court issued a temporary restraining order
based on the APA claim, enjoining repatriation of Haitian in-
terdictees. The court of appeals invoked the district courts' prior de-
nial of the APA claim and adopted the district courts' reasoning for
denying injunctive relief based on the claim. The court of appeals
characterized the district court's order as a preliminary injunction
and decided to review the order. The district court's order was
stayed pending appeal. Here, the court of appeals was in error be-
cause the district court considered an APA claim that was different
from the APA claim decided in HRC L The district court in its
Order Memorializing Oral Rulings explains:
The court recognizes its previous determination that plaintiffs
had not shown a likelihood of prevailing under the APA [Dec. 3,
1991]. That determination was based on Congress' broad grant
of discretion to the President in establishing the interdiction pro-
gram. However, the court now has the benefit of the thorough
briefing of the APA issue before the Eleventh Circuit Court of
Appeals, as well as the Court of Appeals' December 17, 1991
per curiam opinion. In this new light, the court now finds a sub-
stantial likelihood of success, based in part on the distinction
between the President's discretion in establishing the program
and subordinates' discretion or lack thereof in following program
procedures and guidelines.
224
Clearly, the opinion of the court of appeals indicates that it believed
the APA claim ruled upon in HRC II already had been ruled upon
in HRC I. Hence, the court of appeals was in error.
After issuing two brief, analytically deficient opinions, the court
of appeals in HRC III produced a substantial judicial decision with
sustained legal analysis. First, the court of appeals concluded that 5
U.S.C. § 701(a)(1) of the APA did not authorize judicial review of
an agency decision where relevant statutes precluded review. The
court of appeals gave a restrictive reading of the relevant provisions
of INA. Applying a plain meaning approach to the construction of 8
U.S.C. §§ 1253(h), 1252(b), 1105(a) and 1158(a) would lead to the
224. Order Memorializing Oral Rulings, Case No. 91-2653 Atkins at 1, n.l (S.D. Fla.
Dec. 18, 1991).
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conclusion that these provisions apply only to aliens within the bor-
ders of the United States. Unfortunately, the drafters of these provi-
sions could not have foreseen the circumstances of the case, sub
judice. Though, technically outside of the borders of the United
States, the Haitian interdictees were seized or "captured" and de-
tained on property leased by the United States at Guantanamo Bay.
Other Haitian interdictees were held on United States Coast Guard
cutters. These interdictees were physically prevented from reaching
the shores of the United States. Since the interdictees were on
United States property, leased or owned, they should have been
viewed as constructively within or at the -borders of the United
States. It is the opinion of this writer that although the court of ap-
peals strictly construed the relevant provisions of the INA, as
amended by the Refugee Act of 1980, its construction has some ana-
lytical merit. Judge Hatchett's dissent does not refute the Court's
construction of 8 U.S.C. §§ 1253(h), 1252(b), 1105(a), and 1158(a).
The court of appeals' opinion that judicial review was not per-
missible pursuant to § 701(a)(2) because the action was committed
to agency discretion is weakly reasoned. The plaintiffs argued that
the President's subordinates failed to properly carry out the proce-
dures mandated by the INS Guidelines. Consequently, the conduct
of these low-level subordinates would be subject to review. As argued
by Judge Hatchett, the case of Jean v. Nelson supports the plaintiffs'
position. In Jean v. Nelson, plaintiffs were Haitian refugees who
were detained in various facilities in southern Florida until the INS
could determine their asylum claims.225 The majority of the court
remanded the case to the district court with instructions to recon-
sider the issue of whether low-level officials had abused their discre-
tion in implementing the Executive branches parole policy for Hai-
tians. 226 The majority of the court ruled:
The question that the district court must therefore consider with
regard to the remaining Haitian detainees is thus not whether
high-level executive branch officials such as the Attorney Gen-
eral have the discretionary authority under the Immigration and
Nationality Act (INA) to discriminate between classes of aliens,
but whether lower-level INS officials have abused their discre-
tion by discriminating on the basis of national origin in violation
of facially neutral instructions from superiors.
22
1
Further, the court of appeals continued:
Nevertheless, since the discretion of lower-level immigration offi-
225. Jean v. Nelson, 727 F.2d at 961 (11th Cir. 1984) (en banc).




cials is circumscribed not only by legislative enactments but also
by the instructions of their superiors in the executive branch, our
conclusion that the Executive's policy is consistent with the
power delegated by Congress does not end the process of judicial
inquiry here. The district court must still determine whether the
actions of lower-level officials in the field conform to the policy
statements of their supeiors in Washington .
2 8
Oddly, there is absolutely no discussion of Jean v. Nelson by the
majority of the court in HRC III.
The court of appeals also decided that the exception to
701(a)(2), which permits a court to review agency action where the
agency violated its own rules, was not applicable. The court of ap-
peals characterized the INA Guidelines as mere internal operating
instructions. There was evidence that government officials were not
complying with the INS Guidelines promulgated pursuant to Execu-
tive Order 12324.229 These guidelines were adequate binding regula-
tions to which the agency was required to adhere. They are extraor-
dinarily detailed and specific in nature.2 30 They refer to both the
1951 Refugee Convention and the 1967 Protocol as authority. The
majority's opinion that there was no law or binding regulations limit-
ing agency discretion and against which agency discretion could be
reviewed is a clearly erroneous legal conclusion.
The court of appeals further held that HRC had no First
Amendment right of access to the Haitians. Again, the court of ap-
peals ignored the teachings of Jean v. Nelson in which the majority
of the court ruled:
The Supreme Court has repeatedly emphasized that counsel
have [sic] a first amendment right to inform individuals of their
rights, at least when they do so as an exercise of political speech
without expectation of renuneration.
23
As asserted by Judge Hatchett, Jean v. Nelson does not base coun-
sel's First Amendment right of access on the underlying rights pos-
sessed by clients. Additionally, it is uncontestable that the govern-
ment allowed others access to the Haitian interdictees while denying
the same right to HRC.232 The conduct of the government was in-
herently unfair, unjust, and discriminatory. The majority's specula-
tion that the government would have to assist HRC in its exercise of
its right of access finds no support in the record. There was no evi-
228. Id. at 978.
229. See Order Granting Preliminary Injunctive Relief, supra note 13, at 55-60 (sum-
maries of deposition testimony of individual Haitian interdictees).
230. See generally INS Guidelines, supra note 16.
231. Jean v. Nelson, 727 F.2d at 983 (11th Cir. 1984) (en banc).
232. HRC I1, 953 F.2d at 1517.
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dence that the government would have to go to great expense in ac-
tualizing HRC's right of access. The suggestions of the court that
the contrary would be true is a view sown out of the gossamer seeds
of speculation and conjecture.
Perhaps, the most extraordinary ruling of HRC III was the
majority's pronouncement that
[t]he plaintiffs also claim that customary international law, or
international common law, creates enforceable rights. This claim
is meritless and does not warrant discussion.2 3
Again, the majority of the court reached a legal conclusion
without any supportive analysis. It is impossible, therefore, for one to
adequately criticize such a ruling, since the majority has failed to
apprise the parties or readers of a rational basis for its legal decision.
The majority ignored the Supreme Court's holding in the Parquete
Habana,23" declaring international law or the law of nations an inte-
gral part of the law of the United States.3 5 The United States is
bound by customary norms of international law. It is beyond dispute
that the principle of nonrefoulement is considered a customary norm
of international law by most of the countries of the world.2 36 The
233. Id. at 1511.
234. The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677 (1900).
235. The U.S. Supreme Court ruled:
International law is part of our law, and must be ascertained and administered
by the courts of justice of appropriate jurisdiction, as often as questions of right
depending upon it are duly presented for their determination. For this purpose,
where there is no treaty, and no controlling executive or legislative act or judicial
decision, resort must be had to the customs and usages of civilized nations and,
as evidence of these, to the works of jurists and commentators, who by years of
labor research and experience, have made themselves peculiarly well acquainted
with the subjects of which they treat. Such works are resorted to by judicial
tribunals, not for the speculations of their authors concerning what the law
ought to be, but for trustworthy evidence of what the law really is.
Id. at 700.
236. King, supra note 180, at 788; see Brief of High Commissioner for Refugees, supra
note 206, at 7-14. The eminent international law jurist, Louis Henkin, has suggested that
international law is incorporated into the domestic law of the United States and is self-execut-
ing. He states that many scholars view international law as "federal common law." Henkin
writes:
International law is not merely law binding on the United States internationally
but is also incorporated into United States law. It is 'self-executing" and is ap-
plied by courts in the United States without any need for it to be enacted or
implemented by Congress. Since it is law not enacted by Congress, and the prin-
ciples of that law are determined by judges for application in cases before them,
But customary law has often been characterized as federal common law" ....
But customary law is self-executing and like a self-executing treaty it is equal in
authority to an act of Congress for domestic purposes ....
L. Henkin, International Law as Law in the United States, 82 MICH. L. REV. 1555, 1561,
1566 (1984); see Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 877-878 (2nd Cir. 1980) ("Upon ratifi-
cation of the Constitution, the thirteen former colonies were fused into a single nation, of one
which, in its relations with foreign states, is bound both to observe and construe the accepted
norms of international law, formerly known as the law of nations. Under the Articles of Con-
federation, the several states had interpreted and applied the body of doctrine as a part of their
common law, but with the founding of the 'more perfect Union' of 1789, the law of nations
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principle is so important that both the 1951 Refugee Convention and
the 1967 Protocol prohibit reservations to Article 33.237 The court of
appeals' dismissal of the importance of international law in the HRC
litigation case reveals a lack of respect for the law of nations.
Finally, it is surprising that plaintiffs' counsel did not raise the
issue of discrimination based on race or national origin in its argu-
ments before the court of appeals. The issue was raised in Jean v.
Nelson where the court of appeals remanded the case for considera-
tion of whether low-ranking, subordinate, executive officials were
properly executing the immigration policy of the President without
discrimination based on national origin.138 Judge Hatchett, without
alleging discrimination based on race or nationality, suggests the
possibility of disparate treatment in his dissenting opinions. In HRC
I Judge Hatchett wrote:
• ..Under existing law, any refugee may reach the shores of
the United States and thereby acquire the right to enforce the
United States immigration laws in the United States courts, ex-
cept Haitian refugees. Only Haitian refugees are interrupted in
international waters and repatriated to their country of origin
239
The government seeks to convince this court that its in-
terdiction program was instituted as an effort to save the lives of
Haitian refugees travelling in unseaworthy vessels. But the gov-
ernment's own brief shows that the program was instituted in
1981, long before the current immigration wave . . . .The pri-
mary purpose of the program was, and has continued to be, to
keep Haitians out of the United States.24
In HRC III, Judge Hatchett stated:
became preeminently a federal concern.").
237. Brief of High Commissioner for Refugees, supra note 206, at 10. Article 7, para-
graph I of the 1967 Protocol, supra note 19, states:
1.At the time of accession, any state may make reservations in respect of article
iv of the present Protocol and in respect of any provisions of the Convention
other than those contained in articles 1, 3, 4, 16(1) and 33 thereof ....
Article 42, paragraph I of the 1951 Refugee Convention, supra note 19, provides:
I.At the time of signature, ratification or accession, any State may make reser-
vations to articles of the Convention other than articles 1, 3, 4, 16(1), 33, 36-46
inclusive.
238. Jean v. Nelson, 727 F.2d at 963, 978-79 (1 1th Cir. 1984) (en banc). The court of
appeals in Jean v. Nelson quoted Bertrand v. Sava, et al., 684 F.2d 204, 212 n.12, where the
Second Circuit held:
[T]he constitutional authority of the political branches of the federal govern-
ment to adopt immigration policies based on criteria that are not acceptable
elsewhere in our daily life would not permit an immigration official, in the ab-
sence of such policies, to "apply neutral regulations to discriminate on [the basis
of race and national origin]."
Id. at 978.
239. HRC 1, 949 F.2d 1109, 1111 (11th Cir. 1991).
240. Id. at 1112.
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• . . [T]he capture of Haitian refugees in international waters is
authorized under a 1981 agreement between the Reagan admin-
istration and the totalitarian government of Jean-Claude "Baby
Doc" Duvalier. The record does not disclose such a agreement
with any other country.
24 1
• . . Haitians, unlike other aliens from anywhere in the
world, are prevented from freely reaching the continental United
States . . 242
There is extant other evidence of discrimination against Haitian
refugees by the United States government. The interdiction process
began in 1981. From 1981 to August 1986, only two Haitian refu-
gees were permitted entrance to the United States. More than 9,000.
were repatriated during the same period. 24s The following Tables,
prepared by Amnesty International USA, reflect the disparity of
treatment accorded Haitian refugees who have applied for political
asylum in this country between June 1982 and September 1989.244
241. HRC III, 953 F.2d 1515, 1516, n.2 (1lth Cir. 1992).
242. Id. at 1516.
243. King, supra note 180, at 778 (citing U.S. Committee for Refugees, World Refugee
Survey 1986, at 72 (1986)). Jocelyn McCalla, Executive Director of the National Coalition for
Haitians, has stated that from 1981 to 1990 over 20,000 Haitians have been interdicted at sea.
Only 6 interdictees were granted political asylum. Tape of interview of Jocelyn McCalla, Ex-
ecutive Director, National Coalition for Haitian Refugees, by John Hockenberry on Talk of
the Nation (National Public Radio, June 3, 1992).
One commentator has suggested that United States' refugee policy has slid into politics.
He states that of the 122,000 refugees who will be admitted into the United States in 1992,
approximately 61,000 will come from the Commonwealth of Independent States (former
USSR). Dan Barrett, U.S. Refugee Policy Faulted, CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR, Nov. 12,
1992, 19 at col. 3. The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees has charged that
almost no one immigrating from these new commonwealth states are political refugees. Id.
Nonetheless, by virtue of the Lautenberg Amendment of 1989, all individauls from common-
wealth states are deemed subjects of political persecution and are entitled to refugee status
under U.S. law. A citizen of a commonwealth state need only assert that "he is a member of
the covered class and . . . that he has been persecuted or has a fear of persecution, the individ-
ual shall be deemed a refugee." Id. Barrett concludes:
Our refugee policy has outlived its historical mission . . . . Today, immigration
from the commonwealth is politicized in the extreme. Indeed, only in a place like
the old Soviet Union would it come as no surprise that a policy which began
with a humanitarian concern has ended so thoroughly in politics.
id.
244. See Reasonable Fear: Human Rights and United States Refugee Policy, AMNESTY
INT'L USA, Mar. 1990, at 17-18.
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TABLE I
ASYLUM CASES FILED WITH U.S. IMMIGRATION AND
NATURALIZATION SERVICE DISTRICT DIRECTORS




Country Decided Granted Denied
Total* 25.1% 35,358 105,300
USSR 75.6% 306 115
Romania 70:3 % 1,470 619
Iran 61.5% 13,061 8,173
Czechoslovakia 47.4% 170 188
Ethiopia 43.5% 1,796 2,325
China 41.8% 265 368
Syria 40.8% 207 300
South Africa 40.1% 57 85
Poland 37.0% 2,971 5,053
Afghanistan 36.6% 421 729
Somalia 33.8% 262 512
Vietnam 32.8% 75 153
Hungary 29.8% 206 485
Nicaragua 27.1% 10,872 29,154
Uganda 26.2% 98 276
Philippines 16.6% 87 435
Pakistan 15.0% 77 433
Cuba 14.9% 397 2,266
Yugoslavia 11.9% 57 421
Lebanon 9.5% 171 1,623
El Salvador 2.5 % 1,004 37,666
Honduras 2.2% 32 1,407
Sri Lanka 2.1% 3 141
Haiti 2.1% 39 1,795
Guatemala 2.0% 112 5,411
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TABLE II
ASYLUM CASES FILED WITH U.S. IMMIGRATION AND














































































































































*The totals includes all nationalities, not just those listed on the ta-
bles. Of the total 101,679 asylum applications filed in Fiscal 1989,
85 percent were filed by nationals of El Salvador, Guatemala, Hon-
duras, and'Nicaragua.
Source: Immigration and Naturalization Service/United States De-




Amnesty International USA has concluded that the INS is bi-
ased against asylum seekers of certain nationalities. In Reasonable
Fear: Human Rights and United States Refugee Policy, Amnesty
International USA charges that "the most compelling evidence of
bias ...appears in cases of Salvadoreans, Guatemalans, and Hai-
tians. '"45 The norm of nondiscrimination is irrefutably an accepted
norm of customary international law which binds all states in the
international community.246 It would be morally repugnant and hyp-
ocritical if discrimination on the basis of race, color or nationality-
were permitted by the United States on the international level when
it is has been outlawed on the domestic.level.
2 47
III. Conclusion
Recent studies and reports, including a report published by the
State Department, ineluctably demonstrate that political persecution
and human rights violations continue to be a severe problem in Ha-
iti.24 '8 The State Department found that "[t]he military's human
rights record improved under the Aristide government, but that
trend was reversed following the September coup . .. ",249 Another
report reveals that the infamous Tonton Macoutes of the Duvalier
regime have become operative and have mobilized "against all sup-
porters of ousted president Aristide.' ' 25" Thus, the claim that the
Haitian refugees are merely economic refugees and not political ref-
ugees is not supported by the evidence.
The HRC plaintiffs exhausted all judicial remedies. They were
unsuccessful in a petition to the United States Supreme Court that
requested a ban on repatriation. 5 However, as a direct result of the
245. Id. at 16.
246. See generally N. Lerner, GROUP RIGHTS AND DISCRIMINATION IN INTERNATIONAL
LAW (1990); see W. McKean, EQUALITY AND DISCRIMINATION UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW
264-88 (1983). McKean writes, "There are thus sound reasons for accepting that the princi-
ples of equality and non-discrimination, in view of their nature as fundamental constituents of
the international law of human rights, are part of jus cogens." Id. at 283.
247. See generally D. BELL, RACE, RACISM AND AMERICAN LAW (2d ed. 1980); Civil
Rights: Leading Cases (D. Bell ed., 1980).
248. See Haiti: The Aristide Government's Human Rights Record, A Report by Ameri-
cans Watch, the National Coalition for Haiti Refugees and Carribean Rights (Nov. 1, 1991).
The authors of the report observe that the human rights record of Aristide "showed much
promise but . . . was also marked by certain troubling practices." Id. at 3.; see also RETURN
TO THE DARKEST DAYS, supra note 4; COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES FOR
1991, supra note 3. See generally William O'Neill, Paper Laws, Steel Bayonets: Break-down
of Rule of Law in Haiti, Lawyers Committee for Human Rights (1990); Haiti: Amnesty Inter-
national's Current Concerns (Nov. 1988).
249. COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES, supra note 4, at 633.
250. RETURN TO THE DARKEST DAYS, supra note 3, at 11.
251. Haitian Refugee Center, Inc., et al., v. James Baker, III, et al., 112 S. Ct. 1245
(1992). Justice Clarence Thomas, in voting against a grant of certiorari, stated that he was
"deeply concerned" about the allegations of persecution received by Haitians who were re-
turned to Haiti. However, he believed that the problem should be addressed by the Executive
and the Congress. Id. at 1246. Justice Blackman was the only judge who dissented from the
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HRC litigation, several bills have been introduced by various mem-
bers of Congress to give Haitians who are in the United States or "in
the custody or control of the United States (including on Coast
Guard vessels on the high seas) ' '25 2 protected status and to halt the
repatriation process.25
denial of certiorari by the Supreme Court. He stated that the Supreme Court should have
granted certiorari and ruled on the merits "after a full and careful consideration .... " Fur-
ther, Justice Blackman stated that the issues involved in the case were "at least as significant
as any we have chosen to review today." Id.; see Haitian Refugee Center, Inc., et al. v. James
Baker, III, et al., 112 S. Ct. 1072 (1992) (government's application for stay of limited injunc-
tive relief granted by Judge Atkins on Dec. 20, 1991, granted pending disposition of appeal by
the Eleventh Circuit).
252. See S. CON. RES. 71, 102D Cong., 1st Sess. (1991); S. 2026, 102D Cong., 1st Sess.
(1991); S. 2091, 102D Cong., 1st Sess. (1991); S. 2185, 102D Cong., 2D Sess. (1992); S.
2246, 102D Cong., 2d Sess. (1992); H.R. 3844, 102D Cong., 2D Sess. (1992).
253. Id. On May 23, 1992, President George Bush issued Executive Order 12,807 [here-
inafter "Kennebunkport Order"]. 57 Fed. Reg. 23,133, 23,133-34 (1992). The Kennebunkport
Order permits the Coast Guard to interdict Haitians on the high seas and to immediately
return them to Haiti without making a determination as to their political refugee status. Spe-
cifically, the Kennebunkport Order provides, inter alia:
• . . Neither this order nor any agency guidelines, procedures, instructions, di-
rectives, rules or regulations implementing this order shall create, or shall be
construed to create, any right or benefit, substantive or procedural (including
without limitation any right or benefit under the Administrative Procedure Act),
legally enforceable by any party against the United States, its agencies or instru-
mentalities, officers, employees, or any other person. Nor shall this order be con-
strued to require any procedures to determine whether a person is a refugee.
Id. at § 3, 23,134; see Haitian Migrants, 28 Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents
938 (1992) (President Bush explains purpose of Executive Order 12,807 and characterizes
Haitians as ecomonic refugees). The legality of this executive order was challenged in Haitian
Centers Council, et al. v. McNary, 92-CV-1258 (E.D.N.Y 1992). The case was filed on behalf
of the plaintiffs by the Center for Constitutional Rights. The law suit raises all of the issues
litigated in the HRC litigation.
The Kennebunkport Order was upheld by federal district court judge, Sterling Johnson.
Judge Johnson ruled that Article 33 of the 1967 Protocol was not self-executing. However, he
further concluded:
It is unconscionable that the United States should accede to the Protocol and
later claim that it is not bound by it. The court is astonished that the United
States would return Haitian refugees to the jaws of political persecution, terror,
death and uncertainty when it has contracted not to do so. The Government's
conduct is particularly hypocritical given its condemnation of other countries
who have refused to abide by the principle of non-refoulement. As it stands now
Article 33 is a cruel hoax and not worth the paper it is printed on unless Con-
gress enacts legislation implementing its provisions or a higher court reconsiders
Bertrand."
Haitian Centers Council Inc., et al v. McNary, Memorandum and Order, Sterling Johnson,
Jr., at 7-8 (E.D.N.Y. June 5, 1992). In denying the plaintiffs' request for a preliminary injunc-
tion, Judge Johnson held that Bertrand v. Sava, a Second Circuit decision, was controlling.
Judge Johnson held that Bertrand decided the 1967 Protocol's provisions were not self-execut-
ing. Id. at 7; see Bertrand v. Sava, 648 F.2d 204, 218 (2nd Cir. 1982). Judge Johnson ruled
that § 243(h) of the INA (8 U.S.C. § 1253(h)) did not apply to Haitians in international
waters. Id. at 8; see U.S. Policy Appears to Deter Haitians Refugees, WASH. POST, June 6,
1992, at A7; Judge Slams Bush But Clears His Haitian Repatriation Policy, WASH. TIMES,
June 6, 1992, at A3.
Further, Judge Johnson criticized the United States Goverment for hypercritically accus-
ing Great Britian of forcibly repatriating Vietnamese boat people in 1990 when the United
States was now engaging in similar conduct. Id. at 7, n.2. Judge Johnson reiterated his previ-
ous legal conclusion that § 243(h) of the INA did not provide a right to counsel for Haitians
who were not within the borders of the United States. Id. at 8; see Memorandum and Order,
April 6, 1992, 92 CV 1258, 26.
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Though President Bill Clinton promised to reverse former Presi-
The plaintiffs appealed the district court's denial of their request for injunctive relief. On
July 29, 1992, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed the district
court's ruling. Though technically a ruling on a preliminary injunction is not a decision on the
merits, the court of appeals held that § 243(h)(1) of the INA, as amended by the Refugee Act
of 1980, was applicable to aliens intercepted in international waters. Thus, the court of appeals
expressed its opinion that the Kennebunkport Order which allowed the Coast Guard to sum-
marily return Haitians to "their persecutors" in Haiti was illegal. Haitian Centers Council,
Inc., et al. v McNary, No. 92-6144, __ F.2d - (2nd Cir.) 1992 WL 179508, at *1.
In reaching its decision that the request for preliminary injunctive relief should have been
granted, the court of appeals applied the plain meaning doctrine in its construction of the
language found in § 243(h)(1). Prior to 1980, § 243(h)(1) (8 U.S.C. 1253 (h)(l)) read:
The Attorney General is authorized to withhold deportation of any alien within
the United States to any country in which in his opinion the alien would be
subject to persecution on account of race, religion, or political opinion and for
such period of time he deems to be necessary for such reason.
Id. After amendment by the Refugee Act of 1980, the provision read:
The Attorney General shall not deport or return any alien . . . to a country if
the Attorney General determines that such aliens's life or freedom would be
threatened in such country on account of race, religion, nationality, membership
in a particular social group, or political opinion.
Id. at *5.
First, the court of appeals reasoned that the new statute prohibited the Attorney General
from returning "any alien" to a place of persecution rather than "any alien in the United
States." Id. at *5. Section 243(h)(1) applies to any alien without regard to the alien's location
with or without the United States. Id. at *6. Since the language of the statute is unambiguous,
the judicial inquiry or construction of the statute is complete. Haitian Centers Council, Inc., et
al. v. McNary, No. 92-6144, - F.2d - (2nd Cir.) 1992 WL 179508, at *6. The court of
appeals ruled that prior to 1980, § 243(h)(1) created a distinction between those aliens "within
the United States" contradistinguished from others not within the country's borders. Id. at *7.
Congress removed the words "within the United States." Id. It discarded the language. "...
Congress does not intend, sub silentio, to enact statutory language that it has earlier dis-
carded." Id. Second, the court of appeals held that the government's conduct constituted a
return of aliens to their persecutors within the meaning of the statute. Id. at *9. Therefore, the
government's action violated § 243(h)(1) of the INA. Haitian Centers Council, Inc., et al. v.
McNary, No. 92-6144, - F.2d - (2nd Cir.) 1992 WL 179508, at *9.
The court of appeals rejected the government's argument that Articles 33 of the 1967
Protocol and the 1951 Convention on Refugees did not apply extraterritorially on the high
seas. Id. at *11-23. The majority of the court further noted that the practical effects of the
government's action is to prevent Haitians from not only entering the United States, but to
prevent them for gaining entrance into the Bahamas, Jamaica, Cuba, Mexico, the Cayman
Islands, or any other country in which they might seek safe haven. Id. at *16. The govern-
ment's assertion "that returning . . . Haitians to their persecutors is somehow 'in regard for
their safety' is itself absurd." Id. Unfortunately, the court of appeals refused to reach the issue
as to whether Article 33 was self-executing. The majority characticized any discussion of the
self-executing nature of Article 33 as "academic" because the plain language of § 243(h)(1) of
the INA prohibited the United States from returning aliens to their persecutors "no matter
where in the world those actions are taken." Id. at *17.
Subsequent to the court of appeals' decision, the government filed an application for a
stay of the decision in the United States Supreme Court [hereinafter "Supreme Court"] July
29, 1992. The Supreme Court of the United States on August 1, 1992, granted the request for
a stay pending the filing of a writ of certiorari by the applicants. The Supreme Court ordered:
[lI]t is ordered that the judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit, Case No. 92-6144, filed July 29, 1992 . . . [is] stayed pending
the filing of a petition for a writ of certiorari on or before August 24, 1992.
Should the petition for a writ be filed on or before that date this order is to
remain in effect pending the Court's action on the petition. If the petition for a
writ of certiorari is denied, the order is to terminate automatically. In event the
petition is granted, this order is to remain in effect pending the sending down of
the judgement of the Court.
See McNary v. Haitian Centers Council, Inc., et al., No. A-82, __ S. Ct. - Lexis 4766
(8/1/92 Sup. Ct. of United States). Both Justices Blackmun and Stevens dissented ruling that
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dent Bush's policy of returning Haitian immigrants to Haiti after
intercepting them at sea, President Clinton has now retreated from
his campaign pledge. President Clinton has stated: "For the time be-
ing this [policy of forced repatriation] is the right policy ....
Those who leave Haiti by boat for the United States will be inter-
cepted and returned to Haiti by the U.S. Coast Guard. 254 President
Clinton has suggested that more consular officials may be dispatched
to Haiti to facilitate the processing of asylum applications. President
Clinton may also ask Carribean countries to give Haitians temporary
refuge.2 5'
Recently, Haitian detainees have protested the disimilarity of
treatment accorded them as compared to Cuban refugees. Cuban
refugees who arrive in theU.S. are released to relatives without ap-
plying for asylum. These Cubans qualify for permanent residency
after one year of residency. This process is sanctioned and estab-
lished under the Cuban Adjustment Act of 1966.256
An appeal to the legislative branch of government is the forum
of last resort. This author submits that such an appeal should in-
clude legislation that redefines and broadens the definition of politi-
the plaintiffs in the case faced the real and immediate prospect of persecution, terror and
possible death at the hands of those to whom they were being forcibly returned. Id. The gov-
ernment did not make a strong showing that a balancing of the equities would be in its favor.
The government simply presented the Court with "a vague invocation of harm to foreign pol-
icy, immigration policy, and the federal treasury . . . " Id. On October 5, 1992, the United
States Supreme Court granted the government's petition for a writ of certiorari. See McNary,
et al. v. Haitian Centers Council, et al., __ S. Ct. - , 1992 WL 228363 (U.S.), 61
U.S.L.W. 3156 (1992).
Perhaps it is the appropriate historical time to modify the definition of political refugee.
Panjabi has written that "generalized persecution and random violence can be as life threaten-
ing as individual persecution and specific targeting by terrorist or government assassins." R.
Panjabi, International Politics in 1990's: Some Implications for Human Rights and the Refu-
gee Crisis, 10 DICK. J. INT'L L. 1, 11 (1991). Panjabi quotes Barry Stein who has commented:
Rather than fleeing because of individual fear of persecution they have fled gen-
eralized violence, internal turmoil, situations involving gross and systematic vio-
lations of human rights ....
Most contemporary refugees are externally displaced persons rather than "clas-
sic" refugees. They are not fleeing a political controversy that involves them per-
sonally. Often they are getting out of harm's way rather than fleeing
persecution.
B.N. Stein, The Nature of the Refugee Problem, in HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE PROTECTION OF
REFUGEES UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW 52 (A.E. Nash ed. 1988), quoted in Panjabi, id. at
12. Panjabi argues that the classical definition of refugee has outlived its purpose or usefulness.
Id.; see also 1984 Cartenga Declaration on Refugees (Central American definition of refugee
includes individuals who have fled "generalized violence" or "serious disturbances of public
peace"). V. NANDA, REFUGEE LAW AND POLICY 7 (1989).
254. Tom Raum, Clinton Says Haitian Policy Stand - For the Times Being, ADVO-
CATE (Baton Rouge, LA), Jan. 15, 1993, at Al.
255. John Gashko, U.S. Backs U.N. Move on Haiti, WASH. POST, Jan. 7, 1993, at A17.
256. Larry Rohter, 352 Haitians Reach Miami, Where U.S. Detains Them, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 6, 1993, at A2; Joanne Cavanaugh, Haitian Detainees in Florida on Hunger Strike, AD-
VOCATE (Baton Rouge, LA), Jan. 3, 1993, at I IA; see Doing Right by Haitians and Freedom,




cal refugee. The poignant and perspicacious observations of the edi-
tor of the Washington Post are noteworthy:
The test for admission to this country is whether the refugees
have reason to fear political persecution if they return home. For
people from communist countries that used to be taken for
granted.
For increasing numbers of refugees worldwide, as for the
Haitians, the fear of political persecution is no longer a useful
test. Haiti isn't a communist despotism. It's in a state of anar-
chy in which armed men roam the streets knowing that there is
neither an independent police force nor a judiciary capable of
calling them to account . . . .They fear robbery and murder.
They fear starvation in a country that was desperately poor to
begin with and is now under international sanctions that have
cut off the meager trade on which it lived-except perhaps for
the drug trade.
The United States ought not try to repatriate any Haitians
by force until the Organization of American States has gone
farther in its efforts to reestablish a legitimate government there
and reduce the level of violence. It's understandable that the
Bush administration does not want to incite a further migration
of Haitians to this country. But it is ludicrous to tell Haitians
that they aren't real refugees because they aren't fleeing the
right kind of tyranny.
257
257. Who's a Genuine Refugee, WASH. POST, Dec. 30, 1991, at A12. But see Haiti's
Future Appears Cloudy, ADVOCATE (Baton Rouge, LA), 8B (U.S. cannot accept all Haitian
refugees; OAS should continue to search for a solution); see also What's the Rush to Send
Helpless Haitians Home?, USA TODAY, Feb. 3, 1992, at IOA ("Bush administration.., won
a hollow victory over ...helpless Haitians." There is "growing political violence in Haiti."
"Amnesty International reports Haitians are living in 'a climate of fear and repression'...."
"Closing our doors to needy Haitians is bad enough; sending them to their death would be
shameful").
The Bush administration announced that the Coast Guard would no longer stop all Hai-
tian boats attempting to reach the U.S. If the Coast Guard determined the refugees on the
boat were not in "imminent danger," that the vessel was strong enough to proceed and had
enough food and water, the vessel would not be stopped. The Coast Guard will encourage the
Haitians to return to Haiti. This new policy is the result of an overflow of refugees at Guanta-
namo Bay, Cuba. Coast Guard now estimate that approximately 10,404 refugees were inter-
dicted in May 1992 and a total of 34,090 refugees have been interdicted since October 1991.
Clifford Krauss, To Stem Exodus U.S. Won't Pick Up All Haiti Refugees, N.Y. TIMES, May
22, 1992, at AI, A12.
However, the new policy has been denounced as "let them sail, let them sink" by human
rights activists. Rep. John Conyers, D-Mich., called for a reversal of the policy. He stated:
"We are telling these desperate refugees that if the water doesn't kill them, the (Haitian)
military might." Jean-Claude Bajeaux described the change in policy as "a desperate, revolt-
ing decision." He further stated that "[t]he root of the problem is political repression." "Can
the U.S. get away with the hypocracy of saying, "Let them sail, let them sink?" Michael
Norton, Coast Guard Lets Haitian Boats Sail, ADVOCATE (Baton Rouge, LA), May 25, 1992,
at 2A; U.S. Halts Haitian Boat Rescue; New Orleans Lawyer Calls it Genocide, TIMES-PICA-
YUNE (New Orleans, LA), May 23, 1992,.at A22.
After the institution of the Coast Guard's new policy, President Bush by Executive Order,
citing "a dangerous and unmanageable situation" authorized the Coast Guard to return di-
rectly to Haiti those Haitian refugees interdicted at sea. U.S. officials believed that picking up
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and detaining the interdictees at Guantanamo Bay encouraged more refugees to flee Haiti.
The Coast Guard would escort the boats back to Haiti or carry the interdictees who were on
unseaworthy vessels back to Haiti. Arthur Helton of the Lawyers Committee for Human
Rights has described Mr. Bush's order as a "gross violation of international law." "This is as
wrong as it gets in terms of international refugee law. Congress must intervene to provide
recourse to the boat people." Attorneys with HRC also have suggested that the Executive
Order violates international law. The 1967 Refugee Protocol prohibits the U.S. from returning
refugees to a country where they might be persecuted. The practical effect of the policy is to
return interdictees without determining whether they have a right to political asylum in the
United States. Michael Wines, Switching Policy, U.S. Will Return Refugees to Haiti, N.Y.
TIMES, May 25, 1992, at Al, A4; see Bush Strongly Defends Policy of Returning Haitians,
WASH. POST, May 28, 1992, at A8 ("I will not open the doors to economic refugees from all
over the world."); Bush Authorizes Return of Haitians Found at Sea, TIMES-PICAYUNE (New
Orleans, LA), May 25, 1992, at A3; Bush Orders Return of Haitians, ADVOCATE (Baton
Rouge, LA), May 25, 1992, at IA, 4A; William Raspberry, Haiti (I) Dilemma, WASH. POST,
May 29, 1992, at A23 ("We're faced with a diplomatic and moral emergency. [T]he problem
is significantly complicated by the fact that, apart from the refugees-spawning embargo,
America and its hemispheric neighbors are doing precious little to force out the junta and
restore Aristide to power."); William Raspberry, Haiti (2) Dilemma, WASH. POST, June 1,
1992, at A19 ("And the way out of the mess? Fauntroy ... Walter Fauntroy, the District of
Columbia's retired Congressman . . . has no doubt ..... .Lift the embargo, and the refugee
flood will cease."'). See also Ending the Haitian Embargo, WASH. POST, June 3, 1992, at A18;
see Fair Haven for Haitian Refugees, N.Y. TIMES, July 31, 1992, at A26; see also For Hai-
tians, Justice Denied, N.Y. TIMES, August 30, 1992, at 14; Refugee Policy Protested, WASH.
POST, Sept. 10, 1992, at A9 (protesters argued that the Bush Administration is turning away
Haitians solely because of race. Bush policy is "clearly and blatantly racist.").
With the recent election of Bill Clinton as president of the United States, hope is kept
alive for the possible nullification of the Bush Kennebunkport Order. During his campaign,
President-elect Clinton criticized the Bush administration's policy of returning Haitians to Ha-
iti without due process. President-elect Clinton promised to provide hearings on refugee status
for every interdictee. When the Second Circuit declared the Bush executive order illegal, Pres-
ident-elect Clinton stated that the decision was "the right decision" and that Bush was "wrong
to deny Haitian refugees the right to make their case for political asylum." Al Kamen, Hai-
tian Exodus Could Pose Early Clinton Test, WASH. POST, Nov. 12, 1992, at Al, A8.
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